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Abstract
Attacks on the Internet are characterized by several alarming trends: 1) increases
in frequency; 2) increases in speed; and 3) increases in severity. Modern computer
worms simply propagate too quickly for human detection. Since attacks are now
occurring at a speed which prevents direct human intervention, there is a need to
develop automated defenses. Since the financial, social and political stakes are so
high, we need defenses which are provably good against a worst case attacks and are
not too costly to deploy. In this dissertation we present two approaches to tackle
these problems.
For the first part of the dissertation we consider a game between an alert and
a worm over a large network. We show, for this game, that it is possible to design
an algorithm for the alerts that can prevent any worm from infecting more than a
vanishingly small fraction of the nodes with high probability. Critical to our result is
designing a communication network for spreading the alerts that has high expansion.

ix

The expansion of the network is related to the gap between the 1st and 2nd eigenvalues
of the adjacency matrix. Intuitively high expansion ensures redundant connectivity.
We also present results simulating our algorithm on networks of size up to 225 .
In the second part of this dissertation we consider the virus inoculation game
which models the selfish behavior of the nodes involved. We present a technique for
this game which makes it possible to achieve the “windfall of malice” even without the
actual presence of malicious players. We also show the limitations of this technique
for congestion games that are known to have a windfall of malice.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

In recent times, it has become increasingly challenging to protect the internet from
attacks. They have exhibited several trends some of which are: (i) increases in
frequency: large-scale attacks are approximately doubling every year [53]; (ii) increases in speed: the recent slammer worm infected 90% of vulnerable hosts within
10 minutes [37]; and (iii) increases in severity: the slammer worm had many unforeseen consequences including failures of 911 emergency data-entry terminals, network
outages, and canceled airline flights, [37, 16, 28, 25]. In addition, there has been a
broadening of motivations for attack to include extortion [55, 8]; phishing [21, 57, 29];
sending anonymous spam [31, 30]; and political reasons [43, 45]. Modern computer
worms simply propagate too quickly for human detection. Since worms spread at
a speed which prevents direct human intervention, there is a need to develop automated defenses. Since the financial, social and political stakes are so high, we need
defenses which are provably good against a worst case attacks.
In developing effective response mechanisms, one can follow several approaches,
some of which are: develop better technology for defense, commit more resources
to defenses, or collaborate more effectively with our allies, in our defenses. In this
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dissertation, we focus on the third approach. We studied two problems, which are
motivated by the need for developing automated, fast, resource efficient, and provably
secure collaborative techniques.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 1.1 we motivate the
first problem in this dissertation. We also give the model, results overview and
related work for the first problem in subsection 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 respectively.
In section 1.2 we motivate our second problem. We present the model, results and
related works for this section in subsection 1.2.1, 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 respectively.

1.1

The W orm versus Alert game

Many worm containment systems are based on a network centric approach. In an
automatic version of this approach, packet classifiers are deployed which use filter
mechanisms dependent on automatically generated content signatures of worms. The
signatures are generated by identifying common byte strings in suspicious network
flows. However, automatic methods for generating content signatures fail to contain polymorphic worms, as worms can use techniques such as encryption or code
obfuscation [56] to bypass any filters looking for specific byte strings.
In another approach, semantic or behavioral-based systems analyze behavioral
signatures [19, 15, 62, 59]. In particular, they may determine if similar data is being
sent from one machine to another [19]; if there is a suspicious sequence of systems
calls that is being executed by many machines in the network [62, 15, 14]; or whether
any incoming or outgoing network traffic exploits a known vulnerability [59].
Both of the above approaches do not take into account the application level
vulnerabilities which worms could exploit. Also both of them are prone to false
positives, which then becomes a bottleneck in the deployment of automatic worm
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detection systems. Work done by Costa et al. in [15], addresses these concerns to
some extent by proposing a host centric approach. In their system, some nodes in the
network run instrumented software to automatically detect a worm, determine which
vulnerability the worm exploits, and then generate a short trace of the vulnerability
the worm exploits. These nodes are called detector nodes. The trace(or proof) is
called a self certifying alert(SCA’s). Because a SCA is short, it is easily propagated
through a network. A machine which has a SCA can generate a filter that blocks
infection by analyzing the exploit which the SCA proves exists. Because the SCA
focuses on the security flaw exploited by a worm, rather than the textual content
of the worm, SCAs can easily be created for polymorphic worms. This approach to
counter worms, certainly reduces the number of false negatives to a great extent, and
has a negligible rate of false alerts.
In the Vigilante system [14] SCAs can be generated, checked and deployed efficiently. For example, it takes 18 milliseconds to generate a SCA for the Slammer
worm, the resulting SCA is 457 bytes long, the time to verify this SCA is 10 milliseconds, and the time to create a filter from the verified SCA is 24 milliseconds. These
times for SCA generation, verification and filter creation are on the same scale as
the time it takes a worm to infect a machine. Vigilante performs similarly for two
other Internet worms, Code Red and Blaster.
A crucial aspect of this approach that we focus on in this dissertation, is the
algorithm for diffusion of SCA’s through the network. There are certain characteristics we desire in all such systems. Firstly, we want the identity of detector nodes
to be hidden from the worms, because then there is an easy worm strategy to infect
the network, which is to avoid attacking any of the detector nodes. Secondly, the
worms should not be able to use the alert propagation system to carry out Denial
of Service Attacks on the nodes of the network. In other words, it is necessary to
limit the number of SCA’s which an alerted node can flood into the network, and
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the number of SCA’s which a node can receive in a single time step. This can be
achieved by making the alert propagation “polite”, i.e an alerted nodes can only send
SCA’s to their neighbors. The distribution of alerts in the Vigilante system satisfies
these constraints. The underlying overlay network used for propagating alerts in
Vigilante is the Pastry [47] peer-to-peer network. It is shown empirically for this
system, that a very small fraction of special detector nodes is enough to ensure that
a worm infects no more than 5% of the vulnerable population. While these initial
results are promising, several critical problems remain. First, Vigilante requires that
the nodes participating in the overlay network all be resistant to infection. Second,
Vigilante requires that the topology of the overlay network be hidden from the worm.
These two assumptions may hold true for an overlay network owned and operated
by a single company, but seem unlikely to hold for a large-scale open source peer-topeer network. Finally, while the Vigilante systems performs well empirically against
currently known worms, the system has no known theoretical guarantees against all
worms. In our work, we make none of these two assumptions.
On the other hand, worms are becoming increasingly sophisticated. There is
evidence of collaboration between online criminals [20, 53, 64]. In addition there
is evidence that worms can spread arbitrarily on the internet [60]. Therefore it is
reasonable to assume that the worms would be collaborating, and their propagation
would not be constrained by any underlying network.
We will now define the model we studied in this dissertation, which is inspired
by the discussion above.

1.1.1

Our Model

In our game initially no nodes are infected or alerted. Each node in the network
is a detector node independently with fixed probability γ. The game starts with a
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single node becoming infected. In every round thereafter, every infected node can
send out no more than β worms to other nodes in the network. The alerted node
can send out alerts to no more than α neighbors. Here α and β are fixed positive
integers. Nodes in the network change state according to the following four rules:
1) If a worm is received by a node that is not a detector and is not alerted, that
node becomes infected; 2) If a worm is received by a node that is a detector, it is
not infected, instead it becomes alerted; 3) If an alert is received by a node that is
not infected, that node becomes alerted; 4) If a worm or an alert is received by a
node that is already infected or already alerted, then there is no change in the state
of that node. This is a synchronous game. i.e, any message sent out by any node is
received by the destination node in the same time step.
An infected node can choose any nodes in the network to send worm messages.
In contrast, an alerted node can send alert messages only through a previously determined, overlay network. In other words, the alert-spreading algorithm is “polite”
in the sense that it does not bombard arbitrary nodes with alerts unless it knows
that they are interested in receiving them. A particularly sophisticated worm may
exploit the structure of the overlay network for its own purposes. An edge in this
overlay network represents an agreement between two nodes to accept SCAs from
each other.
Secondly, we assume that the infected nodes are intelligent, coordinated and
essentially omniscient. In other words, the infected nodes know everything except
for which nodes are detectors, and the alerted nodes’ random coin flips i.e. they know
the topology of the overlay network used by the alerts; which nodes are alerted and
which are infected at any time; where alerts and worms are being sent; the overall
strategy used by the alerted nodes; etc. Moreover, the worm is unconstrained in
which nodes it attacks. For example, it could always try to infect nodes which have
never been infected before. The alerted nodes are assumed to know nothing about
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which other nodes are infected or alerted, where alerts or worms are being sent, or
the strategy used by the infected nodes.
For the rest of this dissertation we would call this game the Worm versus Alert
game.

1.1.2

Contributions

We start this section with a discussion on specific questions which motivated our
results. First consider the following strategy for worms: since the infected nodes
collaborate and are omniscient, they come to know of any detector nodes they might
have alerted. In the next time step they attack all the nodes adjacent to the alerted
detector node to cut off the spread of SCA’s through the network. Based on this
strategy the following questions arise. Is there a strategy the alerted nodes could
use, which not only will help protect against this possible strategy of the worm, but
also against other perhaps more devious strategies. What are the properties of the
overlay network, that would help protect the nodes?
Another natural question about this strategy is regarding the robustness of this
approach to malfunctioning detector nodes. In the event of a false alert, can we limit
the congestion in the network?
The work in this dissertation explores these questions in detail. Given below is a
chapter wise breakup of results regarding the Worm vs Alert game.
• Chapter 2: Let RANDOM be the algorithm where each alerted node sends to
α neighbors selected uniformly at random with replacement. In this chapter, we
show that if the alerts propagate on a d-regular graph with expansion constant
c, and if

α
β(1−γ)

>

2d
,
c

then RANDOM ensures, that with high probability,

all but a vanishing fraction of nodes get infected as the network size grows.
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Intuitively, this shows that the infected nodes can never completely surround
the set of alerted nodes, because of the high expansion of the overlay network.
We also show that if the overlay network has poor expansion(i.e β(1 − γ) ≥ d),
then there is a strategy where the worms can infect almost all of the nondetector nodes. Next, we give empirical results that suggest that our algorithm
for the propagation of alerts combined with techniques like throttling will be
useful in current large-scale networks. This work appeared in Proceedings of the
Principles of Distributed Systems; 11th International Conference(OPODIS),
2007 [5].
• Chapter 3: False alerts are common in many worm detection systems. In this
chapter, we propose a new algorithm where each alert message has a time to
live(ttl) field which decides the distance to which an alert can spread. By giving
an appropriate value to the ttl parameter, we ensure that a single false alert
will not spread to more than polylogarithmic number of nodes. We present an
alert propagation algorithm in this chapter which uses a c0 log n regular overlay
network to spread, for c0 a constant. This algorithm has two guarantees: 1) it
ensures with high probability that under certain constraints on α, β and γ, all
but a small fraction of nodes will be alerted when attacked by a worm known
to have a lifetime of O(log n) rounds; and 2) any false alert will not spread
to more than polylogarithmic number of nodes. We complement our analysis
with empirical simulations of our algorithm against a fixed worm strategy over
networks of size about 225 . The work in this chapter is under review.

1.1.3

Related Work

In work done in [38], Moore et al. outline three approaches for anti-worm systems:
1) preventing the attack by reducing the number of vulnerable hosts; 2) treatment
based approaches, e.g develop patches and distribute them to infected nodes; and 3)
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containment based approaches, e.g using worm signatures etc. Since the vulnerable
population will always remain due to homogeneous software in hosts, and treatment
based approaches take too much time to implement, as they require distributing
patches, often with human involvement, containment based approaches seem to be
the most viable option.
A standard approach to containing worms, is to blacklist IP addresses which
belong to infected host, but this approach has become increasingly ineffective [41, 44].
It is also prone to false alerts. Content based automatic generation of worms is a
another alternative for containment of worms. There has been significant success
in developing signature generating systems(Vigilante [15, 14], Earlybird [51, 52],
Autograph [26], Polygraph [40] and Shield [59]).
We now describe work in distribution of alerts over an overlay network. Zhou et
al. [63] propose a system for distributing alerts over a network, but their system is
focused on confronting worms that can spread only through the same overlay network
through which the alert is spreading. Vojnovic and Ganesh [58] and Shakkottai and
Srikant [50] perform exhaustive analytical and empirical studies of the effectiveness of
different types of alert dissemination. In work by Vojnovic and Ganesh, they use an
hierarchical model for alert dissemination, as opposed to the flat model in Vigilante.
Shattokai and Srikant make a case for using P2P systems for patch dissemination,
given the exponential data dissemination capabilities of these system. However,
both the above works, focuses only on worms that spread uniformly at random in
the network.
Many automatic signature based systems assume that worms would be designed
to spread very fast. A slow worm may exploit this vulnerability of the detection
system. In [49], an approach is discussed for containing both slow and fast worms.
In [61], a throttling based approach to slow down the spread of worms is discussed.
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1.2

The Virus Inoculation game

In today’s world, many large scale networks, are constituted of selfish components
that are controlled by different authorities. In such a scenario, each node in the
network is selfish and tries to reduce its cost. For the game we discuss in this section,
we will assume that the players are selfish, as opposed to the game in the previous
section, where players were altruistic. Unfortunately, such a scenario may lead to a
large social cost1 for the whole network and may eventually prove disastrous for each
individual node as well. From a game theoretic perspective this phenomenon is often
called the Tragedy of Commons effect [23]. To illustrate this effect more concretely,
we first begin with some necessary definitions.
Definitions: A game consists of a set of n players, {1, . . . , n}. For each player i
there is a set of possible strategies or actions Si . We use s = (s1 , . . . , sn ), where
si ∈ Si to denote a configuration or strategy vector of the game and S = ×i Si is the
universal set of all possible configurations. Let s−i be the n − 1 dimensional vector
of strategies played by all players other than i. There is a cost function ci for each
player i which is a function from S to R. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this
game is a strategy vector s = (s1 , . . . , sn ), s.t ci (si , s−i ) ≤ ci (s0i , s−i ) for all alternate
strategies s0i of player i. If each player i picks a strategy according to a distribution
on Si , such a choice is called a mixed strategy. There is a notion of mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium or simply called Nash Equilibrium, where we assume that players
are trying to minimize their expected costs. Every pure strategy nash equilibrium is
a mixed strategy nash equilibrium. The social cost of the game is the sum of costs of
all individual players. An optimal solution for a game is when a benevolent dictator
decides strategies for each player which minimizes the social cost of the game. The
ratio of the social cost in the worst nash equilibria to the social cost in the optimal
solution is called the Price of Anarchy [27] or PoA. Intuitively, POA measures the
1 the

sum of individual costs
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Tragedy of Commons effect.
We now present a concrete example which exhibits the Tragedy of Commons
effect. As an example of this effect consider the one round pollution game where
there are n players, each of which decide to pollute, which costs zero or to not
pollute which costs one. Each player incurs an additional cost equal to the number
of players that decide to pollute. In this game it is clear that a Nash equilibria occurs
when all the players decided to pollute. The social cost of the game in this case is n2 .
On the other hand the best possible solution for this game is when each of players
decide not to pollute. Then social cost is then n. The PoA of the pollution game is
n.
In this dissertation we study a technique for reducing the PoA in a network
security game. We define and motivate our game in the next section.

1.2.1

Motivating the game

How costly is it to deploy an anti-virus system over a network? In networks where
there is no centralized authority and nodes are free to choose to inoculate or not, the
incentive for the general population to inoculate decreases. Nodes may rely on the
fact that many of their neighbors have decided to inoculate.
We study this problem in the context of a virus inoculation game. This game
was first presented by, Aspnes, Chang and Yampolskiy in [4]. Since then this game
has been studied extensively in the computer science community [34, 35, 33, 24, 22].
Virus Inoculation Game: This game is played out on a graph G=(V,E), which
is a two dimensional torus. Each node is a player in this game. Each player has two
strategies to choose from, either to inoculate or to not inoculate. The cost incurred
to inoculate is 1, and there is no cost of not inoculating. After all the players have
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decided which actions to perform, a virus attacks one node chosen uniformly at
random in G. All nodes which can be reached by this infected node, along paths
consisting entirely of uninoculated nodes, are infected with the virus. Every node
that gets infected pays a cost of L.
In work done by Moscibroda et al in [39], the price of anarchy for this game
is shown to be (n/L)1/3 , where n = |V |. Since n is expected to be much larger
than L, this game has a high price of anarchy. Now suppose there are some nodes
which turn malicious. The malicious players are not concerned with their welfare
and their aim is to always degrade the performance of this game, in this case it
is too increase the social cost of this game. They can do this by communicating
to non-malicious nodes that they are inoculated, even though they are not. The
non-malicious players know the existence of malicious players, but do not know the
identity of malicious players. Surprisingly in [39], it is shown that the presence of
malicious players may decrease the social cost of the game. Intuitively, this holds
since non-malicious players choose their actions based on the perceived threat from
the malicious players, and so are likely to inoculate. This phenomenon is called the
W indfall of Malice. In this dissertation, we show that we can achieve the windfall of
malice effect without the actual presence of malicious players. To achieve this result,
we use the concept of mediators described below.

1.2.2

Mediators

We first motivate the notion of a correlated equilibrium which will be necessary
for defining mediators. A correlated equilibrium is a probability distribution over
strategy vectors that ensures that no player has an incentive to deviate. In other
words, players have access to a global coin toss in deciding their strategies when
implementing a correlated equilibrium.
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A mediator in a strategic game is a probability distribution D(C) over a finite set
of different configurations C that implements a correlated Nash equilibrium. It publicly broadcasts D(C) together with the corresponding configurations to all strategic
players. Moreover, depending on the particular game, to any strategic player it sends
a private message containing the proposed strategy for that player.
As an example of a mediator, consider a mediator for the multi round version of
the pollution game described earlier in this section. Let the number of rounds be
finite but unknown. A valid mediator for this game, can be designed as such: ask all
the players to not pollute to begin with and as soon as any one player violates these
instructions, ask all the players to start polluting.
The cost of obeying the mediator is one per round for each player and n per round
thereafter. So it is in the selfish interests of all the players to follow the mediators
advice.

1.2.3

Contributions

We have seen in section 1.2.2 that there is a mediator for multi round games. Can a
mediator be designed for single round games?
The virus inoculation game shows an improvement in social cost when there are
malicious players in the network. As was described in section 1.2.1, this phenomenon
is called the “Windfall of Malice”. Can we design mediators in such a way that there
is a threat of malicious players, without malicious players being present?
In our research, we address some of these questions. We cover the technical details
of our results in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4: In this chapter, we present a mediator which decreases the social cost
of the virus inoculation game. In particular we achieve a social cost that is asymp-
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totically optimal. We also show a negative result: our technique cannot be used to
decrease PoA in a certain subset of games. The work presented in this chapter was
published in the fifth Workshop on Internet & Network Economics(WINE 09) [18].

1.2.4

Related Work

The concept of a mediator is closely related to that of a correlated equilibrium, which
was introduced by Aumann in [6]. In particular, if a mediator proposes actions to
the players such that it is in the best interest of each player to follow the mediators
proposal, then the mediator is said to implement a correlated equilibrium. There are
several recent results on correlated equilibrium and mediators. The authors in [42]
give polynomial time algorithms that can optimize over correlated equilibria, via a LP
approach, for a large class of multiplayer games that are “succinctly representable”
in the sense that the set of possible strategy vectors over all players is polynomial.
Christodoulou et al. [12] study the price of anarchy and stability in congestion games
where each edge has a linear cost function with positive coefficients. They show that
in such a setting, the price of anarchy for pure equilibrium is almost the same as
the price of anarchy of correlated equilibrium: a difference of no more than 1.4%.
Balcan et al. [9], describe techniques for moving from a high cost Nash equilibrium
to a low cost Nash equilibrium via a “public service advertising campaign”. They
show that in many games, even if not all players follow instructions, it is possible
to ensure such a move . While their result does not explicitly consider mediators,
it is similar in flavor to ours in the sense that an outside third party is acting to
improve social welfare. A major motivation of our use of a mediator is recent work
by Abraham et al. [2], where they shows that it is possible to implement mediators
just by having the players talk amongst themselves. In other words, there exists a
distributed algorithm for talking among the players that enables the simulation of a
mediator. Moreover, they show it is possible to achieve this in a robust manner, even
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with up to linear size coalitions and up to a constant fraction of adversarial players.
Several recent results study the use of mediators that may act on behalf of a
player(see for example [48]). In other words, these results consider the situation
where if a player decides to use the mediator, it first communicates any relevant
information to the mediator and then the mediator acts for the player, without the
player having the opportunity to change the mediators action.

1.3

Structure of the Document

There are four chapters in this dissertation. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are self contained presentations of the technical results regarding the Worm vs Alert game.
Chapter 4 is a self contained presentation of our results regarding the virus inoculation game. Chapter 5 concludes and suggests areas for future work.

14

Chapter 2
Worm Vs Alert without Time to
Live
In this chapter, we present our results about the game described in Section 1.1.1
in Chapter 1. In the algorithm used to propagate alerts in this chapter, we assume
that once a node is alerted, it continues to send out alerts throughout the game.
This is different from the algorithm for propagating alerts presented in the next
chapter, where alerts have a time to live associated with them. For this chapter, we
assume that the detection mechanism is not prone to false alerts, as even a single
false alert by a detector node will spread throughout the network, thereby congesting
the network.

2.1

Chapter Layout

The model of the the W orm versus Alert game is the same as is given in Section 1.1.1, and so is omitted here. An overview of our results is described in 2.2.
We distribute the main technical work of this chapter in two sections. In section 2.3,
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we present our upper bound result. In section 2.4, we show that good expansion
is a desirable property for the overlay network, and if the overlay network has bad
expansion then there is a strategy for the worms, which would almost infect all of
the non detector nodes in the network. We then present empirical results in section 2.5 which use our algorithm for propagating alerts. We finish this chapter with
conclusions in section 2.6

2.2

Results Overview

In our results, we make use of a d-regular overlay network with node expansion c. As
a concrete example, a random d-regular graph has node expansion c = d/5 − 1 with
high probability1 . Throughout this chapter, we use the phrase with high probability
(w.h.p) to mean with probability at least 1−1/n for some fixed  > 0. Let RANDOM
be the algorithm that has each alerted node in each round send out alerts to α nodes
selected uniformly at random without replacement from its neighbors in the overlay.
Our main theoretical results are stated below as the following two theorems which
are proven in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 respectively.
Theorem 2.3: If d ≥ α and

α
β(1−γ)

>

2d
,
c

then the algorithm RANDOM ensures that,

w.h.p, only o(n) nodes are ever infected.
Theorem 2.6: If the overlay network has bounded degree d and β(1 − γ) > d, then
any alert algorithm in expectation will save a fraction of non-detector nodes that
approaches 0 as n gets large
Our empirical results, presented in Section 2.5, show that if the overlay network
is a d-regular random graph, as n grows large, the algorithm RANDOM saves an
1 see

[13] for an algorithm for sampling from random d-regular overlay networks in a
distributed manner
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increasingly large fraction of the nodes against a worm that spreads uniformly at
random. For example, for n = 106 , d = 100, β = 1, α = 5 and γ = .02, we were able
to save 99% of the nodes on average.
In this work we note that if a detector node generates a single false alert, it
propagates throughout the network. We address this problem to some extent in
Chapter 3.

2.3

Alert versus worm in an expanding overlay
network

In this section, we focus on d-regular graphs for our overlay network. We show that
for a suitable choice of parameters and a particular type of overlay network, we are
able to save most of the nodes from getting infected with high probability. More
precisely, at the end of the process only o(n) nodes get infected, and all other nodes
get alerted.
The essential idea is that we want the long-run growth rate of the set of alerted
nodes to be higher than the rate for the infected nodes. The rate for infected nodes
is easy to calculate; assuming an optimal choice of targets, each infected node infects
on average an additional β(1 − γ) nodes per round. The rate for alerted nodes is
trickier, as alerted nodes are limited by the structure of the overlay network. But we
can get a lower bound on the expected rate during the early parts of the protocol
by observing that A alerted nodes will between them have at most dA neighbors, of
which at least cA will not already be alerted, where c is the expansion parameter of
the network. It follows that each alerted node will attempt to alert on average at
least α(c/d) unalerted nodes at each step. In the absence of the worm, this would
give the growth rate of the alerted nodes; with M infected nodes, we must subtract
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these from the pool of new alerted nodes (using the simplifying assumption that the
worm successfully concentrates itself on the boundary of the set A). Fortunately
these lost infected nodes are compensated for somewhat by the boost of γβM new
alerted nodes from triggered detectors.
This overview ignores three important details. Because we want a high-probability
bound, it is not enough simply to consider expected growth rates. And because the
expansion factor applies only for sets with n/2 or fewer elements, we must consider
separately the case where the set of alerted nodes is larger. To our knowledge, a
differential equation will not be able to model this process, since we are dealing with
an adaptive adversary and it can work against any assumption about the growth
rates of the processes involved.
We handle both problems by dividing the execution into three phases. Phase
I starts with a single infected node and ends when ln n worm messages have been
received by nodes in the network. During this phase we ignore the spread of alerts
and content ourselves with getting only the Θ(γ ln n) alerted nodes that result from
successful detections. Phase II starts at the end of of Phase I. During this phase
we use the fact that the number of infected and alerted nodes are both Ω(log n)
to show that both the worm and the SCA propagate at close to the expected rate
with high probability; the key point is that when the populations of both are large
enough, Chernoff bounds apply to the increases. Phase II ends when n/d2 nodes
have been alerted by the SCA; at this point we can no longer rely on the expansion
properties of the network and must resort to a different analysis. Note that there are
expansion properties till the end of Phase II. For this analysis, done in Section 2.3.3,
we show that in constant number of steps, we would alert n/2 nodes and then after c
log(log(n)) further steps we would have only o(n) not alerted or not infected nodes.
Thus we would have shown that only o(n) nodes could have been infected and θ(n)
nodes have been alerted.
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In the remainder of this section, all lemmas that bound a random variable’s value
for t rounds hold with probability greater than or equal to 1 − t/nc for some fixed
constant c > 0. Also for all the remaining lemma’s in this section, d ≥ α.

2.3.1

Phase I

Let Z be the set of nodes that receive the first ln n worm messages; i.e., the set of
nodes that receive worm messages in Phase I.
We write At for the number of nodes alerted at time t, counting from the end of
Phase I; thus A0 is the number of nodes alerted in Z.
Lemma 2.1. At the end of Phase I, (a) the expected number of alerted nodes E[A0 ]
is at least γ ln n; and (b) for any c > 0, there exists a constant δ ≤ 1/2, such that
with probability greater than 1 − 1/nc , (1 − δ)E[A0 ] ≤ A0
Proof. For each v ∈ Z, let Xv be the indicator random variable for the event that
v is alerted in Phase I and let Yv be the event that v is a detector node. While the
Xv are not necessarily independent, we do have that Xv ≥ Yv for all v, and thus
P
P
P
E[Yv ] = γ|Z| = γ ln n. The
A0 = v∈Z Xv ≥ v∈Z Yv . It follows that E[A0 ] ≥
second part is an immediate application of Chernoff bounds.

It follows that A0 is Θ(ln n) with high probability.

2.3.2

Analysis of Phase II

For the second phase, begin by comparing the number of infected nodes in the actual
process with the number of infected nodes in an infinite graph where the SCA has no
effect on the spread of the worm. The process in the latter graph has the advantage
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of being much easier to analyze; and, as we show, it gives an upper bound on the
outcome of the original process.
Formally, let Mt be the number of infected nodes at time t in the original graph,
where as before we count rounds from the start of Phase II. Let Mt0 be the number of
infected nodes at time t in an infinite graph under the assumptions that (a) no alert
messages are ever sent out by the detector nodes, even though they are alerted by
worm messages, and (b) each infected node spreads the worm to β unique, previously
uninfected nodes in the network at each round. Where no confusion will result, we
also use Mt and Mt0 to refer to the set of nodes infected in each case.
Observe that the assumptions for Mt0 only increase the number of infected nodes;
so that Mt0 stochastically dominates Mt in the sense that ∀ k ≥ 0, P r(Mt0 ≥ k) ≥
P r(Mt ≥ k), no matter what strategy the worm applies in the original graph.
Let M0 and M00 count the nodes infected by the end of Phase I, in their respective
simulations. From Lemma 2.1, we have that M0 ≤ |Z| − A0 ≤ ln n.
Lemma 2.2. For all t ≥ 0, the expected value of the random variable Mt0 at time t
is equal to (1 + β(1 − γ))t M0 .
Proof. By our assumption about the number of messages sent by the infected nodes
and the fraction of detector nodes, the expected number of new infected nodes is
β(1 − γ)E[Mt0 ], where (1 − γ) is the probability that a given node is not a detector
0
node. Hence the recurrence relation for E[Mt0 ] is E[Mt0 ]=(1+β(1−γ))E[Mt−1
]. Hence

E[Mt0 ] = (1 + β(1 − γ))t M0 .
We now show that Mt0 remains closely bounded around its expected value, thus
giving an upper bound on the variable Mt .
Lemma 2.3. For any c > 0 and fixed β and γ, there exists a constant k such that,
for sufficiently large n and any t, it holds that Ms0 ≤ kE[Ms0 ] for all s ≤ t
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Proof. We prove the bound for Mt0 , and the bound for Mt follows from the fact that
Mt0 dominates Mt .
0
0
Let St = min(n − Mt−1
, βMt−1
) be the number of nodes that receive the worm

message at step t, assuming that no alert messages are ever sent. Let X(v, t) = 1
if node v becomes infected for the first time at time t, 0 otherwise. Then for each
0
, or the number of bad
v in St , Pr[X(v, t) = 1] = 1 − γ. Define Yt = Mt0 − Mt−1

nodes that have been infected at time step t. Clearly Yt = Σi∈St X(i, t), and thus
(conditioned on St ) Yt has a binomial distribution with expectation St (1 − γ) and
variance St γ(1 − γ).
Fix some c0 > 0; from Chernoff’s inequality, there exists a constant a such that
p
Pr[Yt > St (1 − γ) + a St γ(1 − γ) log n] < n−c .
So with probability at least 1 − n−c , we have

0
Mt0 = Mt−1
+ Yt

p
0
≤ Mt−1
+ St (1 − γ) + a St γ(1 − γ) log n
q
0
0
= Mt−1
βγ(1 − γ) log n.
(1 + β(1 − γ)) + a Mt−1

(2.1)

0
Observe that the bound (2.1) is an increasing function in Mt−1
. It is thus maxi0
0
mized by maximizing Mt−1
, and having an upper bound on Mt−1
is sufficient to get

a (high-probability) upper bound on Mt .
We now proceed by induction on t. Our goal is to show that, with probability at
least 1 − tn−c , for all s ≤ t,
Ms0 ≤ M0 (1 + β(1 − γ))s ·

s−1
Y

1+ p

i=0

b
(1 + β(1 − γ))i

!
,

(2.2)

√

where b =

a βγ(1−γ)
1+β(1−γ)

= O(1). Note that the first two factors give the expected value
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of Mt0 from Lemma 2.2; the product arises from the error term in (2.1). The base
case is t = 0, where M0 ≤ M0 with probability 1.
Now suppose that (2.2) holds with probability at least 1 − (t − 1)n−c for t − 1;
we wish to show that the probability that it suddenly fails for t is at most n−c . First
0
0
divide (2.2) by E[Mt0 |Mt−1
] = Mt−1
(1 + βγ(1 − γ)) to get

s
a
βγ(1 − γ) log n
Mt0
≤1+
·
0
0
0
E[Mt |Mt−1 ]
1 + β(1 − γ)
Mt−1
s
log n
=1+b
0
Mt−1
s
log n
≤1+b
M0 (1 + β(1 − γ))t−1
s
1
=1+b
,
(1 + β(1 − γ))t−1
where b is as in (2.2).
0
Now use the upper bound on Mt−1
from the induction hypothesis to get, with

probability at least 1 − tn−c ,
Mt0 ≤

M0 (1 + β(1 − γ))t−1 ·

t−2
Y

b

1+ p
(1 + β(1 − γ))i
s
!
1
(1 + β(1 − γ)) 1 + b
(1 + β(1 − γ))t−1
!
t−1
Y
b
= M0 (1 + β(1 − γ))t ·
1+ p
(1 + β(1 − γ))i
i=0

!!
·

i=0

as claimed.
To obtain the stated bound, take the logarithm of the correction term in (2.2) to
get
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s−1
X
i=0

b

log 1 + p
(1 + β(1 − γ))i

!

s−1
X

b
p
(1 + β(1 − γ))i
i=0
b
≤
= O(1).
1− √ 1
≤

(1+β(1−γ))

Since the constant does not depend on s, we have Ms0 ≤ M0 (1 + β(1 − γ))s eO(1) =
dE[Ms0 ] for all s ≤ t with probability at least 1 − tn−c .
We now turn to alerted nodes. Let At be the number of nodes that are in the
alerted state at time t. For any set of vertices A, let N (A) be the set of neighbors
of nodes in A in the overlay network that are not themselves in A. Let the random
variable Zt be equal to the number of nodes in N (At−1 ) that receive an alert message
at time step t.
Lemma 2.4. For all t ≥ 0, At ≥ At−1 + Zt - Mt0
0
Proof. Out of the unalerted nodes which receive alert messages, at most Mt−1
nodes

could be infected nodes. Hence the lower bound result holds true.
Lemma 2.5. For all t ≥ 0, E(Zt ) ≥ (cα/d)At−1 .
Proof. Let St−1 be the set of nodes that are alerted at time t − 1 and let n0 =
|N (St−1 )|. Number the nodes in N (St−1 ) from 1 to n0 . Let Xi,t = 1 if the i-th such
P 0
node is alerted at time step t for the first time, and 0 otherwise. Then Zt ≥ ni=1 Xi,t .
P 0
By linearity of expectation, E[Zt ] ≥ ni=1 E[Xi,t ]. Observe that each node counted
in At−1 sends an alert to fixed neighbor with probability α/d; it follows that for each
node i in N (St−1 ), Pr[Xi,t = 1] ≥ α/d. We thus have E[Zt ] ≥ n0 α/d ≥ (cα/d)At−1 ,
where c is the expansion factor.
Lemma 2.6. For all t ≥ 0 At ≥ At−1 + (1/2)E(Zt ) − Mt0 .
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Proof. We now imagine that the alerted nodes use the following process to decide
where to send out their α alert messages. They randomly permute all of their
neighbors and then send out alerts to the first alpha nodes in this random permutation. Imagine further that some alerted node j determines its random permutation by assigning a random variable Xj,i to each node i that is a neighbor
of j. This random variable takes on a value uniformly at random in the real interval between 0 and 1. The nodes that the alert is sent to are thus determined
by finding the α random variables among the d whose outcomes are closest to
0.

For each node i and j, there is a separate such random Xj,i and we note

that these random variables are all independent. Let f be a function such that
Zt = f (X1,1 , X1,2 , . . . , Xm,d ). We note that f satisfies the Lipchitz condition, i.e
0
|f (X1,1 , X1,2 , . . . , Xl,p , . . . , Xm,d ) − f (X1,1 , X1,2 , . . . , Xl,p
, . . . , Xm,d )| ≤ 1. This is the

case since a change in the outcome of a single Xi,j will at most cause one new node to
receive an alert and one old node to not receive an alert. Hence we can use Azuma’s
−

Inequality to say that P r(|Zt − E(Zt )|) ≥ (1/2)E(Zt ) ≤ 2e

(1/4)E(Zt )2
2At−1 d

. Since by the

previous lemma E(Zt ) ≥ (cα/d)At−1 , the right hand side is less than or equal to
−

2e

((cα/d)At−1 )2
8At−1 d

0

which is O(1/nk ) for some constant k 0 > 0 since At−1 is θ(ln n). The

lemma then follows by a simple Union bound.

Let k be the multiplicative constant of the expectation, in the statement of lemma
2.3.
Lemma 2.7. For all t ≥ 0, At ≥ (1 + (αc)/(2d))At−1 − k(1 + β(1 − γ))t ln n
Proof. From Lemma 2.5 and Lemma 2.6 we get that the number of nodes alerted
at round t follows the inequality At ≥ At−1 + (1/2)((cα/d)At−1 ) − Mt0 . Hence At ≥
(1 + (αc)/(2d))At−1 − Mt0 . By Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3 we know that Mt0 is no
more than k(1 + β(1 − γ))t ln n for t rounds, with probability at least 1-t/nc . Hence
replacing the upper bound value of Mt in the above expression yields the inequality
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At ≥ (1 + (αc)/(2d))At−1 − k(1 + β(1 − γ))t ln n.
Let p = (1 + (αc)/(2d)), q = (1 + β(1 − γ)). Hence the recurrence relation as
given in the last lemma is At ≥ pAt−1 − kq t ln n.
Lemma 2.8. For all t ≥ 0, At ≥ pt A0 − k(q t + pq t−1 + . . . pt ) ln n
Proof. Proof is by induction on t. It is easy to see that the base case holds. Assume
that the claim holds for all rounds less than or equal to t-1. Hence At ≥ p(pt−1 A0 −
k(q t−1 + . . . pt−1 ) ln n) − kq t ln n. Expanding the algebraic expression, we get the
expression in the claim.
Let κ = p/q. Then At ≥ pt ln n − pt k(1 + 1/κ + . . . (1/κ)t ) ln n. Or
At ≥ pt (ln n − k(1 + 1/κ + . . . (1/κ)t ) ln n).

2.3.3

(2.3)

Analysis of Phase III

In this phase, we make use of a graph with two types of expansion. We show below
that a random d-regular graph has the types of expansion that we need.
Theorem 2.1. Let d ≥ 30 and  > 0, then with high probability, a random d-regular
graph G has the following properties
1. For any set S such that  log n ≤ |S| ≤
2. For any set S such that

n
d2

n
,
d2

|N (S)| ≥ |S|( d5 − 1).

≤ |S| ≤ n2 , |N (S)| ≥

|S|
.
2

Proof. Recall the following procedure for constructing a graph G that is a random
d-regular graph over n nodes. We create a bipartite graph with n nodes of G on the
left hand side L and copies of these n nodes of G on the right hand side R. Now
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assume that we add edges to this graph by finding d/2 random perfect matchings
(permutations) over n. Finally if merge each node in L with its copy in R, keeping
all edges incident to either the node or its copy, we obtain a random d-regular graph
over n nodes.
We now analyze the properties of a graph created according to this process. Let
S ⊆ L be such that s = |S| ≤ αn . For fixed S and T , let XS,T denote the event that
all edges from the set S go to the set T. Therefore probability of XS,T is no more
sd/2
than nt
, where t = |T |. To see this, order the edges incident to S and note that
the probability that the first of these edges falls in T is t/n . Then given that this
first edge falls in T , the probability that the second edges falls in T is

t−1
n−1

≤

t
n

and

so forth. Let Xs be the event that all edges from any set S of size s go to any set T
of size no more cs. We can bound this probability as follows.

    
n
n
cs ds/2
P r(Xs ) ≤
s
cs
n
 ne s  ne cs  cs ds/2
≤
cs
n
 s 
s
s d/2−c−1 1+c d/2−c
e c
≤
n

Simplify for the fact that s ≤

1
n
d2

we have

#s
d/2−c−1
1
1+c d/2−c
P r(Xs ) ≤
e c
d2
s
 
c d/2 2 c+1
≤
(d e)
d2
"
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Setting c to be d/5, we get that

P r(Xs ) ≤
<

"


1
5d

d/2

#s
(d2 e)d/5+1

d−d/2+(2/5)d+2

s

Let r = d−d/2+(2/5)d+2 and note that for d ≥ 21, r < 1. We thus obtain that

X
 log n≤s≤n/d2

X

P r(Xs ) ≤

rs

 log n≤s≤n/d2
0

= O(n− )

Where the last line hold for some 0 > 0 and for sufficiently large n since the
summation is a decreasing geometric sum and the largest term is r log n .
We next show that the second property holds w.h.p. For n/d2 ≤ s ≤ n/2, we
again get that

P r(Xs ) ≤

 
s d/2−c−1
n

Simplifying for s ≤ n/2 we have
" 
#s
d/2−c−1
1
1+c d/2−c
P r(Xs ) ≤
e c
2
 
s
c d/2
c+1
≤
(2e)
2
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Setting c to be 3/2, we get that

" 
#s
d/2
3
P r(Xs ) ≤
(2e)5/2
4

Let r =


3 d/2
4

X

(2e)5/2 and note that for d ≥ 30, r < 1. We thus obtain that

P r(Xs ) ≤

n/d2 ≤s≤n/2

X

rs

n/d2 ≤s≤n/2
0

= O(n− )

Where the last line hold for some 0 > 0 and for sufficiently large n since the
2

summation is a decreasing geometric sum and the largest term is rn/d . A final
union bound over shows that both the first and second property hold with high
probability.
The following theorem assumes that the overlay network has expansion properties
as given in the Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.2. Assume that at some point, the number of alerted nodes is at least
n/d2 and that the number of infected nodes is no more than n1− for some  > 0.
Then w.h.p, at the end of the process, all but o(n) nodes will be alerted.
Proof. We call a node a virgin node if it is neither alerted or infected. We will show
that if initially there are at least n/d2 alerted nodes and no more than n1− infected
nodes, that for some fixed constant C, after C ln ln n rounds, there will be o(n) virgin
nodes. The number of infected nodes increases by no more than a β + 1 factor in
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each round. Thus, after C ln ln n rounds, the number of infected nodes is no more
0

than (β + 1)C ln ln n n1− = n1− for some 0 < 0 < . Thus, if we can show there are
o(n) virgin nodes after C ln ln n rounds, then it must be true that all but o(n) nodes
are alerted.
Our analysis will occur in two phases, first we will show that we need a constant
number of rounds to have at least n/2 alerted nodes. Then we will show that in
Θ(ln ln n) further rounds, the number of virgin nodes will be only o(n).
We first show that the first phase will, w.h.p., take no more than a constant
number of rounds. Let A be the set of alerted nodes. By the coupon collectors
analysis, we expect any particular node in this set to send out an alert to all of its
neighbors in less than d ln d rounds. Thus, by Markov’s inequality, the probability
that a particular node in this set has not sent out the alert to all its neighbors
in 3d ln d rounds is no more than 1/3. Hence, by a simple application of Chernoff
bounds, w.h.p., at least half of the nodes in A will send out alerts to all their neighbors
in 3d ln d rounds. Let A0 be this set of nodes that send out alerts to all of their
neighbors. Since |A0 | ≤ n/2, we know that N (A0 ) ≥ |A0 |/2. Since every node can
receive alerts from at most d unique nodes, this implies that the number of unique
non-alerted nodes that receive alert messages is at least |A0 |/2d. Moreover, since the
0

number of infected nodes is no more than n1− ≤
that receive alert messages is at least

|A0 |
3d

≥

|A|
.
6d

|A0 |
,
6d

the number of virgin nodes

Thus, while |A| ≤ n/2, in every

1
3d ln d rounds, the number of alerted nodes increases by a factor of 1 + 6d
. Since |A|

is initially at least n/d2 and d is a fixed constant, we can say that in O(1) rounds,
|A| will be greater than n/2.
We now show that the second phase will, w.h.p., take no more than Θ(ln ln n)
rounds. Let V be the set of virgin nodes at some round during this phase. Note that
|V | ≤ n/2 since the number of alerted nodes is now greater than n/2. We further
assume that |V | ≥ n/ ln n since if this is not the case, then there are only o(n) virgin
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nodes and the second phase is thus completed. By the expansion properties of the
overlay network, we can thus say that N (V ) ≥

1
.
2|V |

Further, at least

1
3|V |

of the

nodes in N (V ) must be alerted nodes since the number of infected nodes is only
0

n1− . Again using the coupon collectors analysis, Markov’s inequality and Chernoff
bounds, we can say that, w.h.p., in 3d ln d rounds, at least half of these alerted nodes
will have sent out alerts to all their neighbors. Thus, after 3d ln d rounds, at least
1
|V
6

| alerted nodes will send alerts to nodes in V . Since each node in V can receive

alerts from at most d unique neighbors, the number of virgin nodes that receive alert
messages must be at least

1
|V
6d

|. Thus, while |V | ≥ n/ ln n, in every 3d ln d rounds,

1
the number of virgin nodes decreases by a factor of 1− 6d
. After r rounds, the number
r

−r
1 3d ln d
of virgin nodes will thus be no more than 1 − 6d
(n/2) ≤ e 18d2 ln d (n/2). This

last quantity will be less than n/ ln n provided that r = (18d2 ln d) ln ln n. Thus, we
have shown that in C ln ln n rounds, the number of virgin nodes will be o(n), the
number of infected nodes will be o(n) and all other nodes in the network will be
alerted.

The next theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.3. If d ≥ α and

α
β(1−γ)

>

2d
,
c

then the algorithm RANDOM ensures

that, w.h.p, only o(n) nodes are ever infected.

Proof. Since

α
β(1−γ)

>

2d
,
c

therefore

αc
2d

> β(1−γ). Hence 1+ αc
> 1+β(1−γ), or p/q >
2d

1. From equation 2.3 it is clear that At ≥ pt ln n − 3k ln n. Hence At ≥ pt . Hence
for t ≥ logp n, At ≥ Ω(n). Hence in Phase II, the process cannot last for more that
logp (n) steps. Hence from Lemma 2.3, we know that Mlogp (n) ≤ k(1 + β(1 − γ))logp (n)
with probability greater than 1 − logp (n)/nc . Hence Mlogp n < k q logp (n) . Since p > q,
clearly Mt = o(n) at the end of Phase II. Further it is O(n1− ). Now, from Theorem
2.2 , we know that if we have o(n1− ) infected nodes at the end of Phase II , we
would have at most o(n) infected nodes at the end of the Phase III.
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2.4

Is expansion necessary?

In this section, we consider what happens in graphs with poor expansion properties.
In particular, we look at the growth rate of the number of nodes at distance k from
some initial point of infection, and show that if this growth rate is small, the worm
successfully infects almost every node that does not detect it itself.
For the purposes of this lower bound, we adopt a simplified deterministic version
of the model. We proceed in a sequence of rounds starting from the time at which
the worm is first detected, and think of the graph as organized in layers V0 , V1 , . . .,
where V0 contains the initial a0 alerted and b0 infected nodes, and each Vi is the set
of nodes at distance i from this initial set.
We ignore the structure of the interconnections between layers; instead, we allow
an SCA that has already alerted ai nodes in layer Vi to alert any αai nodes in
layer Vi+1 in one round. Because the worm can spread without regard to the layer
structure, we assume that it can attempt to infect these nodes first; a round thus
consists of the worm attempting to infect nodes in layer Vi+1 followed by the SCA
attempting to alert any nodes that are left.
Let bi be the total number of infected nodes in layer i after round i and let
P
Bi = ij=0 bj be the total number of infected nodes after round i without regard to
what layer they are in. The worm can attempt to infect up to βBi nodes in round
i + 1; of these, γβBi will trigger detectors.
If we similarly let ai be the number of alerted nodes in layer Vi after round i,
then the SCA can attempt to alert αai nodes in layer Vi+1 . But because the worm
goes first, there may not be any nodes left to alert.
The overall pattern in round i + 1 is thus:
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1. The worm attempts to infect up to βBi nodes in layer Vi+1 , of which
(1 − γ)βBi become infected and γβBi become alerted.
2. The SCA spreads from layer Vi to layer Vi+1 , yielding an additional
min(αai , |Vi+1 | − βBi ) alerted nodes.

This gives us the recurrence

bi+1 = (1 − γ) min (|Vi+1 |, βBi )
ai+1 = γ min (|Vi+1 |, βBi ) + min (αai , |Vi+1 | − βBi )
Theorem 2.4. Define ai , bi , and Vi as above. Let |V0 |, |V1 |, . . . be such that, for all
i ≥ 0,
|Vi+1 | ≤ β(1 − γ)

i
X

|Vi |.

j=0

Let b0 ≥ (1 − γ)|V0 |. Then bi ≥ (1 − γ)|Vi | for all i.
Proof. Straightforward induction on i. The base case is given. For the induction
step suppose the claim holds for i. Then we have
bi+1 = (1 − γ) min (|Vi+1 |, βBi )
= (1 − γ) min |Vi+1 |, β

i
X

!
bj

j=0

≥ (1 − γ) min |Vi+1 |, β(1 − γ)

i
X
j=0

= (1 − γ)|Vi+1 |.
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In other words, if the growth rate of the graph is small enough and the initial
set of alerted nodes is small enough, then the SCA has no effect beyond the original
detection sites.
For a large enough graph, a higher initial growth rate or lower initial worm
numbers can be compensated for in the limit. For simplicity, we consider an infinitely
large graph that is again organized into layers V0 , V1 , . . . as above.

Theorem 2.5. Let ai , bi , Vi be as in Theorem 2.4. Let b0 > 0 and let
|Vi+1 |
< (1 − γ)β.
lim sup Pi
i→∞
|V
|
i
j=0

(2.4)

Suppose further that |Vi+1 | ≥ |Vi | for all i. Then

bi
= (1 − γ).
i→∞ |Vi |
lim

Proof. We assume that α is sufficiently large that at the end of round i, any node
in layer i that is not infected is alerted. This assumption only hurts the worm, so if
the assumption is violated the result only improves.
From (2.4), there exists some , i0 such that for all i > i0 ,
P
P
|Vi+1 | ≤ (1 − )(1 − γ)β ij=0 |Vj |. Let ri = Bi / ij=0 |Vj | and compute, for i > i0 ,
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bi+1 = (1 − γ) min (|Vi+1 |, βBi )
= (1 − γ) min |Vi+1 |, βri

i
X

!
|Vi |

j=0

= min (1 − γ)|Vi+1 |, ri β(1 − γ)

i
X

!
|Vi |

j=0



ri
|Vi+1 |
≥ min (1 − γ)|Vi+1 |,
1−


ri
= min 1 − γ,
|Vi+1 |.
1−
Unless ri = 1 − γ, we expect bi+1 /|Vi+1 | to be larger than ri ; in particular we have
bi+1 /|Vi+1 | ≥ min((1 − γ), (1 + )ri ). The new ratio ri+1 is a weighted average of ri
and bi+1 /Vi+1 . Under the assumption that |Vi | is nondecreasing, the weight on the
second term is at least 1/(i + 1). Thus we have

ri+1 ≥

min(1 − γ, ri )
i
ri +
=
i+1
i+1

ri +

min((1 − γ) − ri , ri )
.
i+1

Observe that the first term in the minimum is decreasing and the second increas

P

1
ing. As long as ri < (1 − γ)ri , we have ri+1 ≥ ri i+1
. So ri+k ≥ ri 1 +  k−1
j=i j+1 ;
as the series diverges, eventually ri+k must be large enough that the first term takes
over. But then let si = (1 − γ) − ri , and compute si+1 = (1 − γ) − ri+1 ≤ si −

si
i+1

=

i
i
si i+1
, from which it follows via a telescoping product that si+k ≤ si i+k
, which goes

to zero in the limit.
The proof of the following theorem follows directly from the above.
Theorem 2.6. For a graph with bounded degree d, we have |Vi+1 | ≤ d

Pi

So if (1 − γ)β > d we expect almost no non-detector nodes to be alerted.
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2.5

Empirical Results

We simulated the spread of a worm and an alert through a network to empirically
determine the fraction of nodes saved.2 We performed our experiment using a random
d-regular graph as the overlay network and set each node in the network to be a
detector node independently with probability γ. In addition, we fixed the worm
strategy such that each infected node, in each round, sent out the worm to β unique
nodes selected uniformly at random, and we fixed the alert strategy such that each
alerted node sent out the alert to α unique nodes selected uniformly at random
among its neighbors in the overlay network. We note that the worm strategy we
used in these experiments is not necessarily the best possible worm strategy, but
we selected this strategy for concreteness. Our d-regular random graph was created
using the configuration model method proposed in [10].
In each round we iterate through the set of vertices, allowing each infected or
alerted node to send the worm or alert to the appropriate number of other nodes
in the network. There are several possible strategies for resolving the status of a
virgin (i.e. neither alerted or infected) node that gets both a worm message and an
alert message in the same round. In our previous theoretical analysis, we assumed
that if a node receives just one worm message it becomes infected. However, in our
experiments, we used the somewhat more relaxed and realistic assumption that the
probability that the node gets infected equals the number of worm messages received
divided by the total number of messages received, and that the probability the node
becomes alerted is 1 minus this quantity. We note that this assumption is equivalent
to assuming that the messages all arrive in the node’s message queue according to
some random permutation.
Figure 2.1(a) illustrates our results when γ = 0.1, β = 1, α = 1 and d = 10, where
2 All

of the code necessary to replicate these experiments is available at http://www.
cs.unm.edu/~navin/worm.html.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 2.1: (a) log of the network size versus fraction of nodes saved (b) contour plot
of α versus γ required to save 99%, 95% and 90% of the nodes.

we varied the value of n from 210 to 220 , multiplying at each step by 2. To remove
noise in the simulation, each data point represents the average over 100 trials. The
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best result we obtained was saving only 45% of the nodes for n = 220 . Even though
this final data point is somewhat disappointing, we do observe a clear increasing
trend in the fraction saved as n increases.
Given these results, it seems for current network sizes, there is not much hope
for the alert when α = β. We thus next considered the case where α > β. In practice, this condition may hold since the alerts are traveling through a predetermined
overlay network and a technique such as throttling can ensure that alert messages
received through the overlay are given priority over types of messages. To explore
this scenario, we conducted experiments where we fixed β at 1. We then determined
necessary values of γ for each α ranging from 2 to 10, that would ensure that we
save 90%, 95% and 99% of the nodes (Figure 2.1(b)). The values of n and d used in
the experiment were 106 and 100 respectively. The results of these experiments were
much more encouraging. In particular, for α = 2, we were able to save 99% of the
nodes with γ = .14. When α = 5, we required a γ of .018 to save 99% of the nodes,
and when α = 10, we required a γ of only .001 to save 99% of the nodes. These
results suggest that our algorithms for spreading alerts might be most effective in
conjunction with other techniques (like throttling) that would enable the alerts to
spread more quickly than the worm.

2.6

Conclusion

We have described a simple distributed algorithm for spreading alert messages through
a network during a worm attack and have proven that this algorithm protects all but
a vanishingly small fraction of the network provided that the alerts spread through
an overlay network with sufficiently good node expansion. Our algorithm is provably
good no matter what strategy the worm uses to spread through the network. We have
demonstrated empirically that this algorithm works effectively against a randomly
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spreading worm under conditions that may be reasonable for modern computer networks. Finally, we have shown that if the overlay network has poor expansion, then
the worm will likely infect almost all of the non-detector nodes in the network.

38

Chapter 3
Handling False Alerts in the
W orm versus Alert Game

There has been significant success in developing signature generating systems(Vigilante [15,
14], Earlybird [51, 52], Autograph [26], Polygraph [40] and Shield [59]), but there
has been little focus on designing distributed algorithms for effective deployment of
worm signatures. In this chapter, we present an algorithm which can be used for
distributing many types of worm signatures. In particular, this algorithm that can be
used with any of the above signature generation systems. Moreover, our algorithm
can be used in a network where many different signature generation systems are
being used concurrently. We argue that this last property is particularly important,
since a network with many different signature generation systems is more likely to
catch new worms. Finally, our algorithm has provable guarantees on how quickly the
signatures will be deployed, no matter what strategy the worm uses to try to infect
the network (see Section 3.2).
A critical problem in creating a signature deployment algorithm is the problem
of false alerts. Many worm signature systems sometimes falsely generate signatures
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for traffic that is not malicious. Propagating such a false alert through the entire
network consumes significant network resources and so is extremely undesirable.
There are several conceivable ways of dealing with false alerts. In this chapter, we
take a dampening approach. We assume that periodically any particular detector
node may misfire and generate a false alert. Our goal is to minimize how far these
false alerts can propagate. In particular, we demand that every time that a particular
detector node misfires and sends out a false alert, that that false alert will spread to
no more than a polylogarithmic1 number of other nodes in the network.
A weakness of our approach is that if there are faulty detector nodes in the
network, we do not completely prevent those detectors from sending false alerts.
However, we do constrain the network so that the false alerts are only spread to the
nearby neighbors of a faulty detector. Arguably, it is easier for these nearby neighbors
to track down and fix the faulty detector than for nodes that are further away in
the network. A strength of our approach is that it allows for many different types of
detector nodes. In particular, for any given worm, if some constant fraction of the
nodes in the network are detector nodes that are able to recognize that particular
worm, then our algorithm has provable guarantees for protecting the network.

3.1

Chapter Layout

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The model for the game is the same
as is given in Section 1.1.1 in Chapter 1 and is therefore omitted here. We then give
an overview of our results in section 3.2. We give detailed proofs of our theoretical
results in section 3.4 with an overview of our analysis in section 3.3. We then present
our empirical results in section 3.5. We end this chapter with conclusions and future
1 Polylogarithmic

means O(logc n) for some constant c. We stress that this value is quite
√
small, for example, it is asymptotically much less than O( n).
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work in section 3.6

3.2

Results Overview

Throughout this chapter, we use the phrase with high probability (w.h.p) to mean
with probability at least 1 − 1/nc for some fixed c > 0. Our main algorithm for
propagating an alert is presented as Algorithm 1. In this algorithm all nodes and
all alerts messages have a time to live(ttl) field. Intuitively, the ttl field of an alert
bounds how far that alert can propagate, and the ttl of a node v determines how
long v will propagate alerts. The parameter τ in Algorithm 1 is a user specified
parameter giving the maximum value of any ttl field.
Our theoretical and empirical results suggest that our algorithm for spreading
alerts is most effective in conjunction with techniques like throttling that enable
alerts to be sent more quickly than worms, that ensure that α > β. The fact that
alerts spread only through the special overlay network, where they can be given
priority over other messages, might facilitate a throttling approach.

3.2.1

Theoretical Results Overview

The main theorem of this chapter is stated below and proved in the section 3.4.
Algorithm 1 will be used to achieve this result.
Theorem 3.1. Let α, β, γ be fixed constants, with α, β ∈ Z and assume that the
overlay network is a c0 log n regular graph, for some c0 ≥ 5, and alerts propagate
n)/5−1)
) and q = (1 + β(1 − γ). Then if
according to Algorithm 1. Let p = (1 + α((c02clog
0 log n

• p ≥ 2q 2
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Algorithm 1 Alert propagation for a node v
ttl(v) ← 0
for each round do
ttlmsgs ← Maximum ttl in all msgs received.
ttl(v) ← M ax(ttlmsgs, ttl(v)) − 1
if v is a detector node and it received a worm then
ttl(v) ← τ
end if

if ttl(v) > 0 then
send out messages with ttl field equal to ttl(v) to α neighbors chosen uniformly
at random in the overlay network.
end if
end for

• τ = c2 log log n for some fixed constant c2 to be determined later.

then

• w.h.p in O(log n) steps after the start of the an infection only o(n) nodes will
be infected.
• Each false alert propagates to at most polylogarithmic number of nodes.

Note that with τ = θ(log log n), the false alerts cannot spread to more than
polylogarithmic number of nodes.
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3.2.2

Empirical Results Overview

We empirically evaluated our algorithm for networks of size approximately equal
to 225 . We considered a worm strategy where each infected node chooses β nodes
uniformly at random from the network to send a worm message in each round and
the alerts follow algorithm 1. A sequence of 6 snapshots of the game as played out
for 500 nodes with degree 10 and α = 4, γ = 0.15, β = 1 and τ = 3 is shown in
Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: (Best viewed in color)A sequence of 6 snapshots of the game at rounds
2, 4, 7, 12, 18 and 26. Red nodes are infected nodes, green are alerted nodes and
blue are neither infected nor alerted.
In this particular run of the game, the spread of alerts from a specific detector
node is captured in Figure 3.2. The root of this tree is the detector node and each
edge is labeled by the ttl values that the alert message carries. In the first round
after being alerted the detector node is successful in alerting four neighbors. In the
next round it alerts two more nodes with alert messages with ttl value two. The
right most node at depth two in the tree had been alerted with ttl value two, but all
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the neighbors it chose to send alerts to in successive rounds were already infected,
hence it could nor propagate the alerts any further.
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Figure 3.2: (Best viewed in color)A false alert spreading from a detector node for
τ = 3, α = 4.

In section 3.5 we describe results from simulations for network sizes as large as
225 . For n = 107 , γ = 0.02, β = 2, α = 10, τ = 4, Algorithm 1 is able to save 93% of
the nodes in the network.

3.3

Analysis Overview

In [5], we present an algorithm and constant degree overlay network, which under
certain conditions w.h.p ensures that at most o(n) nodes are infected by any worm.
However this past result suffers from the weakness that a single false alert can propagate through the entire network. In contrast, in this chapter, any false alerts can
only spread to at most a polylogarithmic number of nodes.
Unfortunately, with the restriction imposed by the ttl mechanism on the alerts,
we cannot use the lower bound on the number of alerts in [5], as any alert stops
propagating once its ttl expires. However for τ rounds from the time a detector has
been alerted, we can adapt the analysis for the lower bound on the growth of alerts
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over a θ(log n) degree network from the corresponding lower bounds given in [5]. We
divide our analysis in four phases and the number of nodes alerted, infected at the
end of each phase and the duration in that phase are given in the table in Figure 3.3.
In the remainder of this section, we outline our analysis of the four phases given
in this table. In this table we let q = (1 + β(1 − γ) be an upper bound on the
expected rate of increase of infected nodes. We let p = (1 +

α((c0 log n)/5−1)
).
2c0 log n

We let

p1 = (1 + (1 − e−α )/4). Let r = logp1 q The constants p and p1 are the lower bounds
on the expected rate of spread of alerts in Phase 2 and Part 1 of Phase 3 respectively.
Phase
Alerted
n
1
θ( log2r+2
)
n

Infected
n
θ( log2r+1
),
n

Duration
O(log n)
!

2

≥ n/(3λ)

n

O

r+1+(1−

log

r+1 )r− r 2
logp p
logp p
1
1

θ(log log n)
n

!
≥ n/2

3

n

O

r+1+(1−

log

4

n − o(n)

r+1 )r− r 2
−r
logp p
logp p
1
1

θ(log log n)
n!

n

O

r+1+(1−

log

r+1 )r− r 2
−r
logp p
logp p
1
1

θ(1)
n

Figure 3.3: Phase, # of alerted nodes at the end of the phase, # of infected nodes
at the end of the phase, duration of that phase
We now outline our analysis of Phase 1. We define nodes which are neither
infected nor alerted to be virgin nodes. We define a small step round to be a round
when the number of virgin nodes that receive worm messages is no more than

1
logp1 n

times the number of infected nodes at the end of the previous round. A round which
is not a small step is called a large step round. It is clear(see lemma 3.1) that for a
worm to take over the network in O(log n) time steps, there has to be a large step
round after

n
log2r+1
n
p1

n
nodes have been infected and before κ0 log2r+1
nodes have been
n
p1

infected, where κ0 is a the constant used in Lemma 3.1. Phase 1 is defined to end
at the end of the first large step round which occurs after

n
log2r+1
n
p1

nodes have been

infected. In our subsequent analysis we show that the number of detectors nodes
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alerted in the last round of Phase 1, will be successful in alerting all but n − o(n)
nodes in the network in τ more rounds. Since we start counting the number of alerted
nodes at the end of Phase 1, we define our rounds to begin at the end of Phase 1. Let
Ai and Mi be the number of alerted nodes and infected nodes at the end of round i.
Let the vertex expansion in Phase 2 be called λ. In Phase 2, we use the fact
that our c0 log n regular network has the following property w.h.p: for sets of size
less than n/(3λ), there is θ(log n) vertex expansion. The alerted nodes uses this high
expansion and the fact that p > 2q 2 to catch up and then overtake the number of
infected nodes. We adapt Lemma 8 in [5] to get the following lower bound on the
set of alerted nodes At at round rt :

Lemma 3.4. W.h.p for all t ≥ 0, s.t At−1 < n/(3λ), At ≥pt (A0 − K) for some fixed
constant K.

We then use the above lemma to get an upper bound on the number of rounds
spent in Phase 2. We prove that, with θ(log n) expansion, the alerts need less than τ
rounds to alert n/(3λ) nodes, whereas in the same number of rounds the worm can
infect asymptotically fewer nodes.
In Phase 3, we do not have the same guarantees on vertex expansion as in Phase
2, since the number of nodes that have been alerted exceeds n/(3λ). We now make
use of the following property(Lemma 3.7) which holds w.h.p: for sets S of size less
than n/3, the number of edges with one endpoint in S, and one outside S is greater
than or equal to (|S|c0 log n)/4. We break our analysis of Phase 3 in 2 parts. The
first part begins immediately after the end of Phase 2. We show in Lemma 3.9, that
for this part the expected rate of spread of alerts is at least p1 ≥ (1 + (1 − e−α )/4).
Then by an analysis similar to that of Phase 2, we show that the maximum number
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of rounds taken in Part 1 of Phase 3 is not enough for the infected nodes to break
that o(n) barrier. Part 1 is defined to end at the first round when the number of
alerted nodes is at least n/3. Part 2 of Phase 3 begins immediately after Part 1 ends.
The main lemma of part 2 is the following

Lemma 3.13. On a random d-regular graph, if the number of infected nodes is o(n)
and the number of alerted nodes is greater than n/3, then the maximum number of
rounds required for the number of alerted nodes to exceed n/2 is a constant w.h.p.

To prove this lemma, we show that in each round a constant fraction of the total
number of nodes are being newly alerted w.h.p. Phase 3 is defined to end at the
round when the number of alerted nodes is at least n/2.

At the beginning of Phase 4, there are less than n/2 virgin nodes, and greater
than n/2 alerted nodes. In our analysis in Phase 4 we make use of the high edge
expansion from Phase 3. We make use of the fact that once at least half of the nodes
in the network have been alerted, then due to the high edge expansion from the set
virgin nodes, a constant fraction of virgin nodes will become alerted in each round.
Thus w.h.p, it takes constant number of steps to alert all but n-o(n) nodes.

The proof of our main theorem, i.e Theorem 3.1 is derived from Lemma 3.2,
Lemma 3.6, Lemma 3.12, Lemma 3.13, and Lemma 3.14.
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3.4

Proofs

3.4.1

Large Step Round

In this section we present detailed proofs of the analysis discussed in the previous
section.
In the next two sections we present the detailed analysis of the first phase.
Lemma 3.1. Let t be the first round when the number of infected nodes is at least
n
.
log2r+1
n
p1

If the worm infects θ(n) nodes within O(log n) rounds, there must be a large step
n
round after round t and before κ0 log2r+1
nodes are infected, for some constant κ0 .
n
p1

n
Proof. Suppose not. Then the number of infected nodes is bounded by β log2r+1
(1 +
n
p1

1/ logp1 n)O(log n)−t ≤ β log2r+1 n (1 + 1/ logp1 n)O(log n) ≤ β log2r+1 n e
n

n

p1

p1

O(log n)
logp n
1

n
≤ κ0 log2r+1
n
p1

for some constant κ0 . This last quantity is clearly o(n).
We define Phase 1 to end at the first large step round after round t.
For the sake of simplicity, henceforth we will call the i th round after the end of
phase 1 as round ti . Let the number of nodes alerted by the end of this round be
called Ai .

3.4.2

Phase 1

Lemma 3.2. At the end of Phase 1, (a) the expected number of alerted nodes E[A0 ]
n
); and (b) for any c > 0, there exists a constant δ ≤ 1/2, such
is at least γ( β log2r+2
n
p1

that with w.h.p, A0 ≥ (1 − δ)E(A0 ).
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Proof. We note that the number of infected nodes at the beginning of the last round
of phase 1 is at least

n
.
β log2r+1
n
p1

Let Z be the nodes which are sent worm messages

during the last round of Phase 1. The number of such nodes is greater than

n
,
β log2r+2
n
p1

because the last round is a large step round. For each v ∈ Z, let Yv be the event
P
that v is a detector node. Thus A0 = v∈Z Yv . It follows by linearity of expectation
P
n
). The second part of the lemma is an
that E[A0 ] ≥
E[Yv ] ≥ γ|Z| = γ( β log2r+2
n
p1

immediate application of Chernoff bounds.

We now present the lower bound on the number of alerts which would be used in
the analysis of Phase 2.

3.4.3

Lower bound on the number of Alerts

For the sake of brevity in representation we let d=c0 log n. These lemmas will be
used for proofs in Phase 2 and Phase 3.
Let N(S) be the set of neighbors for set S.
Lemma 3.3. Let d ≥ 30 and  > 0, then with high probability, a random d-regular
graph G has the following properties
1. For any set S such that  log n ≤ |S| ≤
2. For any set S such that

n
3λ

n
,
3λ

|N (S)| ≥ |S|( d5 − 1).

≤ |S| ≤ n2 , |N (S)| ≥

|S|
.
2

Proof. The proof of the above lemma is very similar to the proof of Theorem 2.1 in
Chapter 2, however for completeness we redo the proof with the appropriate changes.
Recall the following procedure for constructing a graph G that is a random dregular graph over n nodes. We create a bipartite graph with n nodes of G on the
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left hand side L and copies of these n nodes of G on the right hand side R. Now
assume that we add edges to this graph by finding d/2 random perfect matchings
(permutations) over n. Finally if we merge each node in L with its copy in R, keeping
all edges incident to either the node or its copy, we obtain a random d-regular graph
over n nodes.
We now analyze the properties of a graph created according to this process. Let
|S| = s. For fixed S and T , let XS,T denote the event that all edges from the set S go
sd/2
, where t = |T |.
to the set T. Therefore Probability of XS,T is no more than nt
To see this, order the edges incident to S and note that the probability that the
first of these edges falls in T is t/n . Then given that this first edge falls in T , the
probability that the second edges falls in T is

t−1
n−1

≤

t
n

and so forth. Let Xs be the

event that all edges from any set S of size s go to any set T of size no more λs. We
can bound this probability as follows.

    ds/2
n
n
λs
P r(Xs ) ≤
s
λs
n
 ne s  ne λs  λs ds/2
≤
s
λs
n
 
s
s d/2−λ−1 1+λ d/2−λ
≤
e λ
n

Simplify for the fact that s ≤

1
n
3λ

we have
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P r(Xs ) ≤
≤
≤
=

#s
d/2−λ−1
1
e1+λ λd/2−λ
3λ
" 
#s
d/2−λ−1
1
(e)λ+1 λd/2−λ−d/2+λ+1
3

s

3
λ+1
3 λ
3d/2−λ
1 d/2−2λ
3λe
3
"

Setting d = 5λ, we get that P r(Xs ) tends to zero for sufficiently large n.
We next show that the second property holds w.h.p. For n/3λ ≤ s ≤ n/2, we
again get that
s
 
s d/2−λ−1 1+c d/2−λ
P r(Xs ) ≤
e e
n
Simplifying for s ≤ n/2 we have
#s
" 
d/2−λ−1
1
e1+λ λd/2−λ
P r(Xs ) ≤
2
" 
#s
d/2
λ
≤
(2e)λ+1
2

Setting λ to be 3/2, we get that

" 
#s
d/2
3
P r(Xs ) ≤
(2e)5/2
4
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Let r =


3 d/2
4

X

(2e)5/2 and note that for d ≥ 30, r < 1. We thus obtain that

X

P r(Xs ) ≤

n/d2 ≤s≤n/2

rs

n/d2 ≤s≤n/2
0

= O(n− )

Where the last line holds for some 0 > 0 and for sufficiently large n since the
2

summation is a decreasing geometric sum and the largest term is rn/d . A final
union bound over shows that both the first and second property hold with high
probability.
The proof of the following lemma derives from lemma 3.3. Also this lemma is an
adaptation of statement 2.3 and is stated here without proof.
Lemma 3.4. W.h.p for all t ≥ 0, s.t At−1 < n/(3λ), At ≥pt (A0 − K) for some fixed
constant K.
A

r1
)/ logp1 pe
Lemma 3.5. If r1 > 0 with Ar1 −1 < n/(3λ), then w.h.p r1 ≤ dlogp1 ( A0 −K

for some constant K.
Proof. Since |Ar1 −1 | < n/(3λ), we know from lemma 3.4 that w.h.p Ar1 ≥ pr1 (A0 −
A

r1
K)) for some fixed constant K. Therefore, w.h.p r1 ≤ dlogp1 ( A0 −K
)/ logp1 pe.

We present the detailed analysis of Phase 2 below.

3.4.4

Phase 2

By Lemma 3.2, the number of alerted nodes at the beginning of Phase 2 w.h.p is
n
lower bounded by (1 − δ)γ β log2r+2
. Let Phase 2 be defined to end at the first round
n
p1
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when the number of alerted nodes is at least n/(3λ).



n

Lemma 3.6. W.h.p the number of infected nodes at the end of Phase 2 is O 

r+1+(1−

logp1

.

Proof. Let r1 be the last round in Phase 2. Note that Ar1 −1 < n/(3λ). By lemma 3.2,
n
. Note that number of rounds spent
we also note that w.h.p A0 ≥ (1 − δ)γ β log2r+2
n
p1

in Phase 2 is r1 . Therefore by application of lemma 3.5, we get that w.h.p r1 is less


than or equal to logp1 αn/(3λ)
/ logp1 p where K is the constant in the statement of
A0 −K
lemma 3.4. Expanding the expression for the upper bound on r1 we get,

r1 ≤
=
=
=
≤



1
αn/(3λ)
logp1
logp1 p
A0 − K

1
logp1 (αn/(3λ)) − logp1 (A0 − K)
logp1 p

1
logp1 (αn/(3λ)) − logp1 (A0 (1 − K/A0 )
logp1 p

1
logp1 (αn/(3λ)) − logp1 A0 − logp1 (1 − K/A0 )
logp1 p
1
((2r + 1) logp1 logp1 n + C0 )
logp1 p

n
where C0 is some constant. The last step follows by noting that A0 ≥ γ( β log2r+2
).
n
p1

Therefore by using
 lemma 2.3, w.h.p thenumber of infected nodes is less than or
equal to q ` M0 = θ 

n
r+1+(1−

logp1

r+1 )r− r 2
logp p
logp p
1
1

.
n

We present the detailed analysis of Phase 3 below.
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3.4.5

Phase 3

We divide the analysis of this phase into two parts. The first part begins immediately
after Phase 2 has ended. The first part ends at the round when the number of alerted
nodes is at least n/3. Let p1 be the lower bound on the expected growth rate of the
number of alerted nodes in this part of the phase. First we show in the following
lemma that there is a θ(log n) edge expansion which will be used in proofs of Phase
3 and Phase 4.
Lemma 3.7. For any random d-regular graph and any set S with size less than n/2,
let ξ(S) be the set of edges with one endpoint in S and one outside S. Then w.h.p
ξ(S) ≥ |S|d/4.

Proof. S has d|S| edges incident on it. The expected number of incident edges with
one endpoint not in S is at least (|S|d)/2. For each vertex i in S, let X(i,ik ) denote the random variable which is 1 when the kth edge incident on i falls outside
S. Let Z(S) denote the total number of edges which have exactly one endpoint
outside S. Therefore Z(S) = f (X(1,10 ) , . . . , X(i,ik ) , . . . , X(|S|,|S|d ) ), for some function f . Note that each of the random variables are independent. Moreover the
function satisfies the Lipchitz condition, i.e |f (X(1,10 ) , . . . , X(i,ik ) , . . . , X(|S|,|S|d ) ) −
0
f (X(1,10 ) , . . . , X(i,i
, . . . , X(|S|,|S|d ) )| ≤ 1, therefore by Azuma’s inequality P r(|Z(S)−
k)

E(Z(S))| ≥ 1/2E(Z(S))) ≤ 2e−

1/4(|S|d/4)2
|S|d

≤ 1/2θ(n) . A union bound over all possible

S gives the required result.

The next two lemma’s are used to compute p1 . We call an edge coming out of an
alerted node as an alerted edge.
Lemma 3.8. Let f (x) =

1−C x
.
x

For C < 1, and 1 ≤ x ≤ d, the minimum occurs at

the largest possible value of x.
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Proof. Note that

df
dx

x

= − 1−C
−C
x2

x

log C
.
x

Setting the value to zero, we get that a local

minima or maxima occurs only when x0 =

1−C x0
1
C x0 log C

. Plugging the value for x0 into

f , we get that f (x0 ) = C x0 log ( C1 ). This last quantity is minimized for x0 as large
as possible, i.e x0 = d. Note that f (1) = 1 − C and f (d) =
that 1 − C ≥

1−C d
.
d

Finally we show

1−C d
.
d

Note that 1−C ≥

1−C d
d

iff 1−C ≥

(1−C)(1+C,...,+C d−1 )
d

iff d ≥ 1+C+C 2 +, . . . , +C d−1 .

The last inequality holds since C i ≤ 1 for all i.
Lemma 3.9. W.h.p, p1 ≥ (1 + (1 − e−α )/4), as n goes to infinity.
Proof. Let r1 be the first round when the number of alerted nodes is at least n/(3λ).
Thus Ar1 ≥ n/3λ. By Lemma 3.7 the number of alerted edges at the end of round
r1 is

nd
.
4(3λ)

If the number of alerted edges on each virgin node is at most x, the

number of nodes which have a possibility of being alerted in round r1 + 1 is at least
nd
.
4(3λ)x

The probability that a virgin node with at most x alerted edges gets alerted

in round r1 + 1 is at least (1 − (1 − αd )x ). Therefore the expected number of alerted
nodes in round r1 + 1 is at least

nd 1
(1
4(3λ) x

− (1 − αd )x ). Substituting (1 − αd ) for C in

the statement of lemma 3.8, we see that f (x) is minimized at x = d, since d is the
largest possible value for x in this context. So the number of new alerted nodes at
round r1 + 1 is at least

nd 1
(1 − (1 − αd )d )
4(3λ) d

≥

nd 1
(1 − e−α ).
4(3λ) d

Therefore the number

of nodes in Ar1 +1 is at least Ar1 (1 + (1 − e−α )/4)
The next two lemma’s are used to compute the maximum number of rounds spent
in this phase.
The following lemma is an adaptation of statement 2.3 and is presented here
without a proof.
Lemma 3.10. Let r1 be the first round when the number of alerted nodes is at least
n/(3d). For all r2 > r1 , s.t |Ar2 −1 | < n/3, w.h.p |Ar2 | ≥ pr12 −r1 (n/(3d) − K 0 ) for
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some constant K 0 .
Lemma 3.11. Let r1 be the first round when the number of alerted nodes is at least
A

r2
n/(3λ). If r2 > r1 and Ar2 −1 < n/3, then w.h.p r2 − r1 ≤ dlogp1 ( n/(3λ)−K
0 )e where

K 0 is the constant in the statement of lemma 3.10.

In the following lemma we estimate the upper bound on the number of infected
nodes at the end of the first part of Phase 3.
Lemma 3.12. Let r1 be the first round when the number of alerted nodes is at
least
infected nodes at the end of the r1 th round is w.h.p
 n/3. The number of 
O

n
r+1+(1−

logp1

r+1 )r− r 2
−r
logp p
logp p
1
1

.
n

Proof. By definition, the number of alerted nodes at the beginning of Phase 3 is
at least n/3λ. By Lemma 3.11, the number of rounds taken to to reach at least
n/3 alerted nodes is w.h.p upper bounded by logp1 logp1 n + C00 , where C00 is some
constant.
2.3 the number of infected nodes is no more
 Then by application of lemma

than O 

n
r+1+(1−

logp1

r+1 )r− r 2
−r
logp p
logp p
1
1

. Note that this is o(n).
n

We define the second part of the phase to begin when the first part ends. For the
second part of this phase we make use of the following lemma.
Phase 3 is defined to end at the first round when at least n/3 nodes have been
alerted. We show in the following lemma that the number of rounds spent in the
second part of this phase, is w.h.p a constant.
Lemma 3.13. On a d-regular graph, if the number of infected nodes is o(n) and the
number of alerted nodes is greater than n/3, then the maximum number of rounds
required for the number of alerted nodes to exceed n/2 is a constant w.h.p.
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Proof. By lemma 3.7, w.h.p the number of alerted edges, incident on virgin nodes is
greater than or equal to dn/12. Let x be the number of virgin nodes that each have
greater than or equal to d,0 <  ≤ 1 alerted edges incident on them. By definition
of x, xd + (n − n/3 − x)d ≥ (dn)/12, or x ≥

n
( 2+1
(1−) 12

− ).

The probability that a virgin node with d alerted edges gets alerted in the next
time step is at least 1 − e−α . Therefore by a linearity of expectation argument
the total number of nodes which receive alerts in the next time step is at least
n
n
( 2+1
− ). We can find an  s.t (1 − eα ) (1−)
( 2+1
− ) is greater than
(1 − e−α ) (1−)
12
12

n/c00 for some constant c00 > 1.
Then by an application of Azuma’s inequality, we show that the expected number
of new nodes alerted is tightly bounded around the expectation w.h.p. Thus in the
second part of Phase 3, θ(n) nodes are being alerted in each round. This proves that
w.h.p it takes constant number of rounds for the number of alerted nodes to reach
n/2 from the beginning of the second part of Phase 3.
Corollary 1. The number of infected nodes at the end of Phase 3 is w.h.p upper
bounded by o(n).

Proof. By lemma 3.12 the number of infected nodes at the end of part 1 of Phase 3
is o(n). Lemma 3.13 says that it take θ(1) rounds to reach the end of Phase 3. The
number of alerted nodes at the end of Phase 3 is w.h.p q θ(1) o(n) which is o(n).

Finally we present the detailed analysis of the last phase of our analysis.

3.4.6

Phase 4

At the beginning of Phase 4, there are at least n/2 alerted nodes, o(n) infected nodes
and less than n/2 virgin nodes. Let the set of virgin nodes be called V with size v.

57

Chapter 3. Handling False Alerts in the W orm versus Alert Game

We can assume that all the edges which go out of V, go to the set of alerted nodes,
as the number of infected nodes is o(n). For the sake of analysis let us assume that
the number of alerted nodes at the beginning of Phase 4 is exactly equal to n/2

Lemma 3.14. If there are at least n/2 alerted nodes and at most o(n) infected
nodes, it takes only a constant number of steps w.h.p, for the number of virgin nodes
remaining to be o(n).

Proof. We know by lemma 3.7 that the number of edges with one end point in V
and one end point outside V is at least |V |d/4. Let x be the number of virgin nodes
with greater than or equal to d alerted edges, where 0 ≤  < 1. The value of 
will be assigned later to suit our needs. Therefore (v − x)d + dx ≥ dv/4. Hence
(1 − )x ≥ v/4 − v, or x ≥

v
(1/4
(1−)

− ). If a virgin node has at least d alerted

edges incident on it, the probability that it does not receive an alert from an alerted
neighbor is (1 − α/d)d ≤ e−α . The probability that it does receive an alert from
any of its neighbors is 1-e−α . Please note that this analysis assumes no multi-edges
. Hence, by the linearity of expectation argument, the number of new alerted nodes
in each round is

v
(1/4 − )(1 − e−α ),
(1−)

which is greater than v/c0 for some constant

c0 > 1.
Then by Azuma’s inequality we can show that the number of new alerted nodes
is closely concentrated around its expected values, by an analysis similar to that
shown in the proof of Lemma 3.13. Thus in constant number of steps, the number
of alerted nodes is n − o(n), whereas by an application of Lemma 2.3 the number of
infected nodes remain o(n).
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3.5

Empirical Results

We simulated the spread of a worm and an alert through a network to empirically
determine the fraction of nodes saved.2

3.5.1

Empirical Setup

For all the experiments, we fixed the worm strategy such that each infected node, in
each round, sends out the worm to β unique nodes selected uniformly at random, and
we fixed the alert strategy according to Algorithm 1. We note that the worm strategy
we used in these experiments is not necessarily the best possible worm strategy, but
we selected this strategy for concreteness. We stress that our theoretical results hold
for any worm strategy.
We performed experiments on two kinds of networks. For the first network, we
use a random d-regular directed graph as the overlay network. Our d-regular directed
random graph was created on the lines of the configuration model proposed in [54].
We have an array of nodes id’s containing d stubs each for every one of the n node
id’s. This nd size array is in increasing order. We take a random permutation of
this array and map the corresponding elements of the first array and the permuted
array to get a d-regular directed graph. We ignore self loops and multi-edges in this
implementation. We call this network a random network
For the second network we make use of the pairwise independent hash functions
described in [36]. In this model, node id i maps to (ai+b) mod n, where n is a prime
and 0 < a ≤ n − 1, 0 ≤ b ≤ n − 1. We find 50 distinct values of a chosen uniformly
at random between 1 and n − 1. We find 50 values of b chosen uniformly at random
2 All

of the code necessary to replicate these experiments is available at http://www.
cs.unm.edu/~navin/false-alerts.html.
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between 0 and n − 1. This gives us 50 pairwise independent hash functions which
map a node i to 50 other nodes in the network. We call this network a pseudo-random
network.
The relative advantage in the implementation of the pseudo-random network over
the random network is in not having to store explicitly the graph in the memory.
We compute the neighbors of a node in real time when we need to access them. The
implementation of the default mod function was computationally intensive. To make
this operation more efficient we store 2i mod p, 0 < i < log2 p in one preprocessing
step and access the stored values throughout the simulation. All multiplications
between integers is reduced to multiplications between powers of two. For the rest
of this section we give sizes of the network in this network model in terms of the
largest power of two smaller than the prime number representing the actual size of
the network. In our experiments we use hash table primes given at [1].
There are several possible strategies for resolving the status of a node that gets
both a worm message and an alert message in the same round and is neither infected
nor alerted before that round. In our theoretical analysis, we assumed that if a node
receives just one worm message it becomes infected. However, in our experiments, we
used the somewhat more relaxed and realistic assumption that the probability that
the node gets infected equals the number of worm messages received divided by the
total number of messages received, and that the probability the node becomes alerted
is 1 minus this quantity. We note that this assumption is equivalent to assuming
that the messages all arrive in the node’s message queue according to some random
permutation.
Our first experiment measured the fraction of nodes saved when we varied both
α and n. In our second experiment we measured the fraction of nodes alerted and
infected at each round of the algorithm. To further explore the role of α in our
model, in our third experiment, we measured the fraction of nodes saved as α varies.
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In this experiment we ensure that the τ value is always adjusted so that the number
of nodes which can be alerted due to a false alert is always 104 . So τ = blogα 104 c.

3.5.2

Results

To remove noise in our experiments, each data point was averaged over 100 trials.
Figure 3.4(a) shows a contour plot of log of the number of nodes in the network
vs the fraction of nodes saved for the first experiment. The values of the other
parameters were as follows; β = 2, γ = 0.02, τ = 5 and α takes on all even values
between 2 and 10. Since it is easier to carry out simulations for much larger values of
n on the pseudo-random network, we vary the number of nodes for this network from
212.58 to 225.58 . The size of the regular network varies from 212 to 222 . We observe
that there is a very small increase in the fraction of nodes saved in the pseudorandom network as n crosses 218.58 , so in all our other experiments we have limited
the network size of the pseudo-random network to the size of the random network.
These results suggest that our algorithms for spreading alerts might be most effective
in conjunction with other techniques (like throttling) that would enable the alerts to
spread more quickly than the worm. There is a very small increase in the fraction of
nodes saved as n grows larger, implying that the results may be better for very large
values of n.
For the second experiment, we plotted the fraction of nodes saved/infected in
each round for both kind of networks. The network sizes considered were of the
order of 107 nodes. Here γ = 0.02, β = 2, α = 10 and τ = 5. For runs of the
simulation where the number of rounds is less than the other runs, we repeat the
final values to compensate for the missing rounds, while calculating the average of
100 trials. In Figure 3.4(b) we see results for the second experiment. We are able to
save about 93% and 91% of the nodes for the random and pseudo-random networks
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Figure 3.4: (a) contour plot of log of # of nodes vs fraction of nodes saved for
α = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 (b)number of nodes saved/infected in each round

respectively. Notice that the value of α is five times that of β. In practice, this
condition may hold since the alerts are traveling through a predetermined overlay
network and a technique such as throttling can ensure that alert messages received
through the overlay are given priority over other types of messages. The number of
nodes saved in the pseudo-random network is less than the number of nodes saved
for the random network in all of our experiments. That is expected as the expansion
of the pseudo-random network may be worse than the expansion of the random
network.
For our third experiment the number of nodes are fixed at 223 (223.58 for the pseudorandom network). Here β = 2 and γ = 0.02. The value of τ is always adjusted so
that the number of nodes which can be alerted due to a false alert is always 104 . So
τ = blogα 104 c. In this experiment we find an improvement of around 20% in the
fraction of nodes saved for values of α between three and seven for both the network
models. The results of this experiment are given in Figure 3.5. We note that there
is a decrease in the number of nodes saved when we go from α = 6 to α = 7. We
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Figure 3.5: alpha vs fraction of nodes saved

believe this happens because the value of τ at α = 6 is five and at α = 7 it decreases
to four.

3.6

Conclusion

In this chapter we have described an alert propagation algorithm which under certain
conditions, w.h.p saves all but o(n) nodes from a worm attack, and limits the spread
of false alerts to polylogarithmic number of nodes. We make use of a θ(log n) regular
network for distributing alerts. We have demonstrated empirically that this algorithm works effectively against a randomly spreading worm under conditions that
may be reasonable for modern computer networks.
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Chapter 4
On the power of Mediators

In the previous chapters, we assumed that the nodes in a network were altruistic. In
this chapter we present a game, in which players are selfish.
Recent results show that malicious players in a game may, counter-intuitively,
improve social welfare [39, 7, 46]. For example, in [39] it is showed that for a virus
inoculation game, the existence of malicious players may actually lead to better
social welfare for the remaining players than if such malicious players are absent.This
improvement in the social welfare with malicious players has been referred to as the
“windfall of malice” [7]. The existence of the windfall of malice for some games leads
to an intriguing question: Can we achieve the windfall of malice even without the
actual presence of malicious players?
In this chapter, we show that the answer to the previous question is sometimes
“Yes”. How do we achieve the beneficial impact of malicious players without their
actual presence? Our approach is to use a mediator. Informally, a mediator is a
trusted third party that suggests actions to each player. The players retain free will
and can ignore the mediator’s suggestions. The mediator proposes actions privately
to each player, but the algorithm the mediator uses to decide what to propose is
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public knowledge. The contributions of this chapter are the following: We introduce
a general technique for designing mediators that is inspired by careful study of the
“windfall of malice” effect. In our approach, the mediator makes a random choice
of one of two possible configurations, where a configuration is just a set of proposed
actions for each player. The first configuration is optimal: the mediator proposes
a set of actions that achieves the social optimum (or very close to it). The second
configuration is “fear inducing”: the mediator proposes a set of actions that leads
to catastrophic failure for those players who do not heed the mediators advice. The
purpose of the second configuration is to ensure that the players follow the advice
of the mediator when the optimal configuration is chosen. Thus, the random choice
of which configuration is chosen must be hidden from the players. We show the
applicability of our technique by using it to design a mediator for the virus inoculation
game from [39], that achieves a social welfare that is asymptotically optimal.
We also show the limits of our technique by proving an impossibility result that
shows that for a large class of games, no mediator will improve the social welfare
over the best Nash equilibrium. In particular, this impossibility result holds for the
congestion games that in [7] it s shown to have a windfall of malice. Thus, we show
that some games with a windfall of malice effect can not be improved by the use of
a mediator.

4.1

Layout of this Chapter

In Section 4.2 we give a few basic definitions which are common to all games. Then,
in Section 4.3 we consider the virus inoculation game in detail. Section 4.4 and 4.5
then contain results about the network congestion games, and finally in Section 4.6
we conclude with some open problems.
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4.2

Basic definitions and notation.

A correlated equilibrium is a probability distribution over strategy vectors that ensures that no player has incentive to deviate. We define a configuration for a given
game to be a vector of pure strategies for that game, one for each player. We define a
mediator for a game to be a probability distribution D(C) over a finite set of different
configurations C. The set of configurations C and the distribution D(C) are known
to all players. However, the actual configuration chosen is unknown, and the advice
the mediator gives to a particular player based on the chosen configuration is known
only to that player. We say that a mediator is valid if all players are incentivized
to follow its advice. In this case, the mediator implements a correlated equilibrium.
From a distributed computing viewpoint, the major difference between a correlated
equilibrium and a Nash equilibrium is that in a correlated equilibrium, players share
a global coin, but in a Nash equilibrium, players only have access to private coins.
Throughout this chapter, we will only consider mediators that treat all players
equally, i.e., once having decided (by a random experiment according to D(C)) which
is the configuration the mediator is choosing from, all players have the same probability to be proposed a particular strategy. Also, throughout the chapter we assume
that the number of strategic players, n, is very large (tending to infinity). Finally, we
will use the notation a(n) ∼ b(n) if a(n) = b(n)(1 ± o(1)). We also use the notation
[n] = {1, . . . , n}.

4.3

Virus Inoculation Game

We now describe the virus inoculation game from [39, 4]. There are n players, each
corresponding to a node in a square grid G. Each player has two choices: either to
inoculate itself (at a cost of 1) or to do nothing and risk infection (which costs L).
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After the decision of the nodes to inoculate or not, one node selected uniformly at
random is infected with a virus. A node v that chooses not to inoculate gets infected
by the virus if either the virus starts at v or the virus starts at another node v 0 and
there is a path of not inoculated nodes connecting v and v 0 .
We define the attack graph Ga to be the graph induced on G by the set of all nodes
that do not inoculate. Aspnes et al. [4] proved that in a pure Nash equilibrium every
component of the attack graph has size n/L. The social welfare achieved in such an
equilibria is thus Θ(n). However, Moscibroda et al. [39] proved that the minimum
social cost is Θ(n2/3 L1/3 ) for the grid, which occurs when the components in Ga
are of size (n/L)2/3 . Moreover, they show that the existence of enough Byzantine
players, who can never be trusted to inoculate, ensures that the social welfare of any
Nash equilibria is slightly better than Θ(n).
Based on the result from [39], we observe that the main problem in this game is
that the individual players do not have enough fear of being infected. In particular,
they are unable to achieve the optimal social welfare because they form connected
components in Ga that are too large. Thus, we design a mediator that randomly
chooses between two configurations (see Figure 4.1). The first configuration is optimal: all components in Ga are of size (n/L)2/3 . The second configuration is “fear
inducing”: any node that does not inoculate in this configuration has probability
about 1/2 of being infected. The only purpose of the second configuration is to
ensure that the selfish players follow the advice of the mediator when the optimal
configuration is chosen.
Clearly, we only want to choose the fear inducing configuration with very small
probability. The critical fact that enables us to do this is the fact that for a given
player, when that player is advised to inoculate, the posterior probability that the
mediator is in the second configuration increases significantly over the prior probability. This is the case because so many more nodes are told to inoculate in the
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second configuration. Thus, players that are told to inoculate are more likely to be
infected. Finally, we also note that nodes that are told not to inoculate are more
likely to be in the first configuration and thus not to be attacked.
We now formally describe the mediator for this game.1 The mediator will choose
randomly between one of the following two configurations C1 and C2 .
Configuration C1 : The mediator proposes a pattern of inoculation such that 1)
all nodes that do not inoculate are in one giant component in Ga ; 2) each node has
equal probability of being chosen to inoculate; and 3) the probability that a fixed
node inoculates is 12 − 2√1 n . The mediator accomplishes this in the following manner:

1. The mediator flips a coin. If it comes up heads, it proposes that all nodes in
even columns do not inoculate. If it comes up tails, it proposes that all nodes
in odd columns do not inoculate.
2. The mediator chooses a random integer, x, uniformly between 1 and

√

n. For

each of the columns that have not already been told not to inoculate, the
mediator proposes that each node in that column inoculate except for the x-th
node in that column.

Configuration C2 : The mediator proposes a pattern of inoculation that ensures
that 1) each component in Ga is of size no more than ( Ln )2/3 ; 2) each node is chosen to
inoculate with equal probability; and 3) the probability that a fixed node inoculates
is at most 2(L/n)1/3 . It does this as follows.

1. The mediator chooses integer x uniformly at random in the range 1 to (n/L)1/3 .
√
√
ease of analysis, we assume that both n and ( Ln )1/3 are integers. Also, n should
be an integer multiple of ( Ln )1/3 (this assumption can be removed easily without effecting
our asymptotic results)
1 For
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(n/L)1/3

√

C2

Figure 4.1: The
game

√

n

C1

√
n× n grid with two configurations C1 , C2 for the virus inoculation

2. For every node v in row r and column c, if one of the following two conditions
hold, the mediator proposes v to inoculate: 1) r ≡ xmod((n/L)1/3 ); or 2)
c ≡ xmod((n/L)1/3 ). Otherwise the mediator tells v not to inoculate.

For these two configurations C1 and C2 we now define the probability distribution
D({C1 , C2 }) with p1 = cL−2/3 n−1/3 and p2 = (1 − cL−2/3 n−1/3 ), where c > 0 can be
chosen to be any small constant satisfying c > 2L/(L − 1) (in particular c = 4 always
suffices).
We can now prove the main theorem of this section which shows that D({C1 , C2 })
is asymptotically optimal.
Theorem 4.1. D({C1 , C2 }) is a mediator with social welfare Θ(n2/3 L1/3 ).
Proof. To prove the statement, we need a few definitions. Define by EIj the event
that the mediator advises player j to inoculate and define by EI¯j the event that the
mediator advises player j not to inoculate. Since all players are to be treated equally
by the mediator, we will omit the index j. Define also by EA the event that a not
inoculated node gets infected by the virus, and denote by CA the infection cost of a
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not inoculated node. We also use the notation CI to denote the cost of inoculation
(clearly CI = 1). We first need to show that D({C1 , C2 }) indeed yields a mediator.
That is, we have to verify the following conditions of a correlated Nash equilibrium:

E [CA |EI ] ≥ E [CI |EI ] = 1
E [CA |EI¯] ≤ E [CI |EI¯] = 1,

which is equivalent to showing that

Pr (EA |EI ) ≥ 1/L

(4.1)

Pr (EA |EI¯) ≤ 1/L,

(4.2)

since for any event E with Pr (E) > 0, we have that E [CA |E] = LPr (EA |E). We
denote furthermore by Ei , i = 1, 2, the event that configuration Ci , i = 1, 2 is chosen.
Note that Pr (EA |E1 ) = 1. To prove (4.1), first observe that

Pr (E1 |EI ) = Pr (E1 , EI )/Pr (EI )
√
p1 (1/2 − 1/(2 n))
√
,
∼
p1 (1/2 − 1/(2 n)) + 2p2 (L/n)1/3

and similarly for Pr (E2 |EI ). Now, plugging in the values of p1 , p2 and using that
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L ∈ o(n) we get

2

Pr (EA |EI ) = Pr (EA , E1 |EI ) + Pr (EA , E2 |EI )
= Pr (EA |E1 , EI )Pr (E1 |EI ) + Pr (EA |E2 , EI )Pr (E2 |EI )
1
≥ Pr (E1 |EI ) + 2/3 1/3 Pr (E2 |EI )
L n √
p1 (1/2 − 1/(2 n))
√
∼
p1 (1/2 − 1/(2 n)) + 2p2 (L/n)1/3
2p2 (L/n)1/3
√
+ (L−2/3 n−1/3 )
p1 (1/2 − 1/(2 n)) + 2p2 (L/n)1/3
(c/2)L−2/3 n−1/3 + 2L−1/3 n−2/3
∼
(c/2)L−2/3 n−1/3 + 2(L/n)1/3
2cL2/3 n2/3 + 4Ln1/3
=
2cL2/3 n2/3 + 4L5/3 n2/3
c
,
∼
c + 2L

which is greater than 1/L for c > (2L)/(L − 1). Similarly, to prove (4.2), note that

Pr (E1 |EI¯) = Pr (E1 , EI¯)/Pr (EI¯)
√
p1 (1/2 + 1/(2 n))
√
∼
,
p1 (1/2 + 1/(2 n)) + p2 (1 − 2(L/n)1/3 )

2 if

L = θ(n), then any pure Nash equilibria is trivially asymptotically optimal
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and analogously for Pr (E2 |EI¯). Hence,

Pr (EA |EI¯) = Pr (EA , E1 |EI¯) + Pr (EA , E2 |EI¯)
= Pr (EA |E1 , EI¯)Pr (E1 |EI¯) + Pr (EA |E2 , EI¯)Pr (E2 |EI¯)
1
≤ Pr (E1 |EI¯) + 2/3 1/3 Pr (E2 |EI¯)
L n
√
p1 (1/2 + 1/(2 n))
√
∼
p1 (1/2 + 1/(2 n)) + p2 (1 − 2(L/n)1/3 )
p2 (1 − 2(L/n)1/3 )
−2/3 −1/3
√
+ (L
n
)
p1 (1/2 + 1/(2 n)) + p2 (1 − 2(L/n)1/3 )
(c/2)L−2/3 n−1/3 + L−2/3 n−1/3
∼
(c/2)L−2/3 n−1/3 + 1
c+2
,
∼
2L2/3 n1/3
which is smaller than 1/L since L ∈ o(n). Thus, we have shown that D({C1 , C2 })
indeed is a valid mediator in that players will follow its advice. We next compute
the social cost for this mediator. Let I1 (Ī1 ) be the set of nodes that inoculate
(respectively do not inoculate) in C1 , and let I2 (Ī2 ) be the set of nodes that inoculate
(respectively do not inoculate) in C2 . Then the social cost for the mediator can be
written as

p1 (|I1 | +

X

LPr (EA |E1 , EI¯)) + p2 (|I2 | +

v∈Ī1

∼

c
L2/3 n1/3

X

LPr (EA |E2 , EI¯))

v∈Ī2

(n/2 + (n/2)L) + (2n2/3 L1/3 + nL

1
L2/3 n1/3

= (3 + (c/2))n2/3 L1/3 + (c/2)(n/L)2/3 = Θ(n2/3 L1/3 ).

72

)

Chapter 4. On the power of Mediators

4.4

Impossibility Result

In light of the results in the previous section, a natural question is: Is it possible
to design a mediator that will always improve the social welfare in any game for
which there is a windfall of malice? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is
“No”, as we show in this section. In particular, we show that the congestion games
which Babaioff, Kleinberg and Papadimitriou have proven have a windfall of malice
effect [7] do not admit a mediator that is able to improve the social welfare. In fact,
we prove a stronger impossibility result, showing that for any non-atomic, symmetric
congestion game where the cost of a path never decreases as a function of the flow
through that path (of which class of games, the examples in [7] are special instances),
no mediator can improve the social optimum. In the rest of this section, we first define
the congestion games we consider and then prove our impossibility result for these
games.
A non-atomic, symmetric congestion game (henceforth, simply a congestion game)
is a specified by a set of n → ∞ players; a set of E facilities (or edges); A ⊂ 2E actions (or paths); and finally, for each facility e a cost function fe associated with that
facility. A pure strategy profile A = (A1 , . . . , An ) is a vector of actions, one for each
P
player. The cost of player i for action profile A is given by Fi (A) = e∈Ai fe (xe (A))
where xe (A) is the fraction of players using e in A. As in [7], we assume that the
game is non-atomic: since n → ∞ the contribution of a single player to the flow over
a facility is negligible; and symmetric: all players have the same cost functions.
For an action a and a flow x ∈ [0, 1], let Fh (a, x) be the maximum possible cost
of following action a when the total fraction of players following this action is x,
where the maximum is taken over all ways that the remaining flow of 1 − x can
be distributed over other actions. Similarly, let F` (a, x) be the minimum cost of
following action a when the total fraction of players following this action is x.
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Figure 4.2: Examples where Theorem 4.2 applies

We prove the following theorem for congestion games where the cost function
of every action is always non-decreasing in the fraction of players performing that
action. The theorem says that for such games, coordination between the agents in
order to establish a correlated equilibrium will not decrease the social cost.
Theorem 4.2. Consider a non-atomic, anonymous congestion game. If for all a ∈ A
and 0 ≤ x ≤ x0 ≤ 1, Fh (a, x) ≤ F` (a, x0 ) then the smallest social cost achieved by
a correlated equilibrium is no less than the smallest social cost achieved by a Nash
equilibrium.

We give an overview of the proof of this theorem in subsection 4.4.1 and then the
detailed proof in subsection 4.4.2
Figure 4.2 gives examples of congestion games for which Theorem 4.2 applies. In
these graphs, if the costs of all edges are non-decreasing in flow, then the smallest
social cost achieved by a correlated equilibria is no better than the smallest social
cost achieved by a Nash equilibria. In both examples, all players must travel from the
source node s to the sink node t, so the set of allowable actions are just the set of all
paths from s to t. The graph on the left is a specific example of a more general class
of graphs for which all paths are disjoint and edge costs are non-decreasing, for which
Theorem 4.2 applies. The graph on the right is a generalization of the congestion
game from [7], which they show has a positive windfall of malice for certain nondecreasing cost functions. In the next section and in Figure 4.3 described therein,
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examples of congestion games for which Theorem 4.2 does not hold are given.

4.4.1

Overview of Theorem 4.2

In this section we give a high level sketch of how we prove Theorem 4.2. We will
fix a non-atomic, anonymous congestion game G with q actions, a1 , . . . , aq , and n
players. We define a configuration, C, for such a game to be a partitioning of the set
of players across the q actions. We note that the number of possible configurations
is finite; in particular, q n . We next fix a mediator, M , for this game. We assume the
mediator uses ` different configurations C1 , . . . , C` ; that 0 ≤ xi,j ≤ 1 is the fraction
of the players in configuration Cj assigned to action ai ; and that ci,j ∈ R is the cost
in configuration Cj for action ai . We further assume that for all j ∈ [`], pj is the
probability with which the mediator M chooses Cj .
For any two actions a, a0 we define the a posteriori cost of a given a0 as the
expected cost for a player of performing action a when action a0 is suggested by
the mediator M ; formally, POST (a, a0 ) = E [Ca |Ea0 ], where Ca is a random variable
(over the configuration chosen by the mediator) and Ea0 is the event that action a0
is recommended by the mediator. We define the a priori cost of action a as the cost
of a player completely ignoring what the mediator suggests and always performing
P
action a; formally, PRI (a) := `j=1 pj ci,j .
The sketch behind our proof for this theorem is as follows. First, we show in
Lemma 4.1 that for all actions a, if the cost of a is non-decreasing in the flow through
a, then POST (a, a) ≥ PRI (a). We show this by repeated decompositions of terms
in summations for the a priori and posterior costs. Next, let Y be the cost of a player
listening and following the advice of the mediator, and let X be the cost of the player
if she just ignores the advice of the mediator and always chooses the action a that
minimized PRI (a). In Lemma 4.2 we show that it must be that E(Y ) ≤ E(X). This
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lemma is shown by summing up inequality constraints on the mediator. Finally, we
use these two lemmas to show the main theorem by showing that if Lemma 4.1 holds,
then E(Y ) > E(X). The main technical challenge is the fact that we must show that
E(Y ) > E(X) even though Lemma 4.1 does not necessarily give a strict inequality.
We address this problem by a subtle case analysis in the proof of the main theorem,
and by augmenting Lemma 4.1 to show that in some cases, the inequality it implies
is strict.
We now present the detailed proof of Theorem 4.2

4.4.2

Proof of Theorem 4.2

Observe that the condition for all a ∈ A and 0 ≤ x ≤ x0 ≤ 1, Fh (a, x) ≤ F` (a, x0 )
implies that for all i ∈ [m], ∀j, k ∈ [`] we have that xij ≤ xik implies cij ≤ cik , and
so the conditions of the following lemma are satisfied. We begin with Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.1. Given ` ≥ 2 configurations C1 , . . . , C` , with corresponding probabilities
pr > 0, r ∈ [`]. If for i ∈ [m], ∀j, k ∈ [`] we have that xij ≤ xik implies cij ≤ cik ,
then POST (ai , ai ) ≥ PRI (ai ). Moreover, if for any i ∈ [q], not all cij , j ∈ [`] are
the same, then POST (ai , ai ) > PRI (ai ).
Proof. Consider without loss of generality action a1 . During this proof we use the
notation of xi for x1i and ci for c1i , i ∈ [`]. Assume also without loss of generality
that the configurations are ordered in such a way that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ x` and
P
thus c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ c` . Note that POST (a1 , a1 ) = P` 1 p x ( `i=1 pi xi ci ) and
i=1 i i
P
PRI (a1 ) = `i=1 pi ci . Thus we must show that:
`
X
i=1

`
`
X
X
p i x i ci ≥ (
pi ci )(
pi xi ).
i=1

i=1

If all xi are the same, then we clearly have equality and in this case POST (a1 , a1 ) =
PRI (a1 ). Otherwise, we will show that this inequality is true by decomposing the xi
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terms into x1 and i terms, i ≥ 0 (and there exists at least one j with j > 0). For
any i ∈ {2, . . . , `} we write xi = x1 + 1 + . . . + i−1 . Consider only the summands in
the above inequality that contain the term x1 . If x1 = 0 then clearly the inequality
holds for such summands. If x1 > 0, we get the following chain of inequalities for
the summands containing x1 :

`
X

p i x 1 ci

`
`
X
X
≥ (
pi ci )(
p i x1 )

i=1
`
X
i=1
`
X
i=1

i=1
`
X

p i ci ≥ (
p i ci ≥

i=1
`
X

pi ci )(

i=1
`
X

pi )

i=1

p i ci ,

i=1

so this inequality holds.
Now consider the summands in the inequality containing j for 1 ≤ j ≤ ` − 1.
We get the inequality:
`
X

`
`
X
X
pi j ci ≥ (
pi ci )(
pi j ).

i=j+1

i=1

i=j+1

If j = 0, the inequality holds. If j > 0, for that j showing the previous inequality
is equivalent to showing
`
X
i=j+1

`
`
X
X
p i ci ≥ (
pi ci )(
pi ).
i=1

i=j+1

To show that this inequality is true, we decompose the ci terms into c1 plus δi terms.
That is, ci = c1 + δ1 + . . . + δi−1 , for i = 1, . . . , ` − 1. Consider first the c1 term. If
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c1 = 0, again the inequality holds trivially. If c1 > 0, we get the chain of inequalities
`
X

p i c1 ≥ (

`
X

i=j+1

pi c1 )(

i=1

`
X

pi ≥ (

`
X

i=j+1
`
X
i=j+1

pi )

i=j+1

pi )(

i=1

pi ≥

`
X

`
X

`
X

pi )

i=j+1

pi ,

i=j+1

which holds. Next we consider the δk terms for k ≤ j + 1. If δk = 0, the inequality
clearly holds for summands containing this term. If δk > 0, we get the inequality
chain:
`
X

p i δk ≥ (

i=j+1

`
X

pi δk )(

pi ≥ (

i=j+1

`
X
i=k+1

pi )

i=j+1

i=k+1

`
X

`
X

pi )(

`
X

pi )

i=j+1

which also holds. In particular, since p1 > 0, we have that (

P`

i=j+1

pi ) < 1, and so

if δk > 0, the inequality is strict. Finally, we consider the δk terms for k > j + 1. If
δk = 0, the inequality holds trivially. If δk > 0 we get the inequality chain:
`
X

pi δk

`
`
X
X
≥ (
pi δk )(
pi )

i=k
`
X

i=k

pi

i=j+1

`
`
X
X
≥ (
pi )(
pi ),

i=k

i=k

i=j+1

which also holds.
Now, we note that if not all ci are the same for i ∈ [`], it must be the case that
there exists some j such that δj > 0, and it follows that we must also have that j > 0.
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As shown above, in such a situation, we obtain a strict inequality over the summands
containing the term δj , and so the entire inequality, POST (a1 , a1 ) > PRI (a1 ) must
be strict.

Define by apri := argmina PRI (a). Given a mediator over a fixed set of configurations, let X be the random variable denoting the cost of an arbitrary player
P
when he decides to use action apri , i.e., E [X] = `j=1 pj capri j . Denote also by Y
the random variable of the cost when following the advice of the mediator, i.e.,
Pm P`
Pm
E [Y ] =
j=1 pj xij cij . We have the following
i=1
i=1 POST (ai , ai ) Pr (Ei ) =
relationship between Y and X.

Lemma 4.2. For any mediator we have E [Y ] ≤ E [X].

Proof. Assume without loss of generality that action a1 is the action with apri .
The constraints for a correlated Nash equilibrium are that for all actions ai and


aj , E [Cai |Eai ] ≤ E Caj |Eai . These constraints imply that

∀i:2≤i≤q :

`
X

pj xij cij ≤

j=1

`
X

pj xij c1j .

j=1

Summing all of these q − 1 inequalities together gives the single inequality, which we
can rearrange as follows to show our result:
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q
`
X
X

pj xij cij ≤

q
`
X
X

i=2 j=1

i=2 j=1

` X
m
X

`
X

pj xij cij ≤

j=1 i=2

j=1

q
` X
X

`
X

pj xij cij ≤

j=1 i=2

j=1

q
` X
X

`
X

j=1 i=1

pj xij cij ≤

pj xij c1j ⇐⇒

pj c1j

q
X

xij ⇐⇒

i=2

pj c1j (1 − x1j ) ⇐⇒
pj c1j ⇐⇒

j=1

E [Y ] ≤ E [X].

We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.2.

Proof. Denote by apost := argmins POST (s, s) the action with minimum a posteriori
cost. We will consider two cases.
Case 1: Not all actions have the same a posteriori cost. Then, we have:

E [Y ] > POST (apost , apost )
≥ PRI (apost ) by Lemma 4.1
≥ PRI (apri ) = E [X].
Case 2: All action have the same a posteriori cost. In this case, we make use of
the fact that there always must be some action that does not have equal costs in
each configuration. Assume not. Then the cost of each action is the same in every
configuration, and so any particular configuration must be a Nash equilibrium that
achieves social cost equal to the social cost of the correlated equilibrium. Thus, we
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let ax be some action that does not have the same cost in all configurations. Then
we have:
E [Y ] = POST (ax , ax )
> PRI (ax ) by Lemma 4.1
≥ PRI (apri ) = E [X].
In both cases we have E [Y ] > E [X]. This however contradicts Lemma 4.2, hence
there can not exist a correlated equilibrium achieving social cost less than the optimal
Nash equilibrium.

4.5

The Possibility of Mediation

We end this chapter on a positive note, by describing a simple congestion game where
we can show that a mediator will improve the pure nash equilibrium solution. This
simple game gives additional insight into why our mediator for the virus inoculation
game works.
The game we consider is a variant of the El Farol game [3, 17, 11, 32]. El Farol
is a3 tapas bar in Santa Fe. Every Thursday night, a population of people decide
whether or not to go to the bar. If too many people go, they will have a worse time
than if they stayed home, since the bar will be too crowded. In our variant of the
problem, we also assume that if too few people go, they will have a worse time than
if they stayed home, because the bar will be too boring. We can model this as a
non-atomic, symmetric congestion game as follows. There are two facilities e1 and
e2 , and two actions a1 = {e1 } and a2 = {e2 }. For all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, fe1 (x) = 1/2 and
fe2 (x) = |1 − 2x|.
We observe that the social cost in our game is minimized when the flow over both
edges is 1/2, in which case, the social cost is 1/4. This configuration, however, is not
3 very

tasty
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a Nash equilibrium. Pure Nash equilibria occurs when the top flow is 1/4 or the top
flow is 3/4, for a social cost of 1/2. We now describe a mediator that improves upon
the social welfare of the pure nash equilibrium.
Configuration C1 : The mediator advises all players to perform action a1 .
Configuration C2 : The mediator advises half of the players to perform action a1 ,
and advises the other half to perform action a2 .
For these two configurations C1 and C2 consider now the probability distribution
D({C1 , C2 }) with p1 = 1/3 and p2 = 2/3.
Observation 4.1. D({C1 , C2 }) is a mediator with social welfare 1/3. Moreover, 1/3
is the optimal value that can be obtained by a mediator.
Proof. Define by Eis , i = 1, 2, s = 1, . . . , n, the event that the mediator proposes to
player s to go on the i’th edge and define by Cis , i = 1, 2, s = 1, . . . , n, the cost for
player s of going on the i’th edge. Since the mediator treats all players equally, we
will leave out the index s. Therefore, for a mediator to implement a correlated Nash
equilibrium, the following inequalities must hold:
E [C2 | E1 ] ≥ E [C1 | E1 ],

(4.3)

E [C1 | E2 ] ≥ E [C2 | E2 ].

(4.4)

For the particular choice of p1 = 1/3 and p2 = 2/3, it is easy to see that both (4.3)
and (4.4) are satisfied.
Now we show that 1/3 is the optimal value that can be obtained by any mediator.
Let x1 be the flow on e1 and x2 be the flow on e2 . The argument is as follows:
for (4.3) to be satisfied, a configuration with x1 ∈ [0, 1/4] ∪ [3/4, 1] has to be chosen,
and among all these the configuration C1 of the previous example is the one which
has minimum total cost and the same time allows for the highest probabilities for
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Figure 4.3: Congestion Games where mediation helps

configurations outside this interval. For the remaining values of x1 ∈ [1/4, 3/4], C2
minimizes the total cost.

Figure 4.3 illustrates the two games we have described for which mediation helps.
The left subfigure portrays our variant of the El Farol game, where the cost of the
top path a1 is always 1/2 and the cost of the bottom path varies as shown in the plot
below the graph. The values of F` (a2 , x) and Fh (a2 , x) are equal, since in this game,
when the flow through the top path is known, the cost of the bottom path is exactly
determined. The two x’s on the plot show the configurations used by the mediator.
As implied by Theorem 4.2, for mediation to be effective, one of these x’s must be
below and to the right of the other on the plot. The right subfigure in Figure 4.3
portrays virus inoculation as a congestion game. The cost of the top path a1 for
this game is always 1. The cost of the bottom path, a2 , is any point in the polygon
shown in the plot. We now have a polygon, rather than a line, because for a fixed
number of nodes that do not inoculate, the cost of not inoculating varies depends on
how the inoculated nodes are positioned on the grid. F` (a2 , x) is the bottom border
of this polygon and Fh (a2 , x) is the top border. Again the two x’s on the plot show
the configurations used by the mediator, and again it is critical that one of these x’s
be below and to the right of the other. For the virus inoculation problem, we needed
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a clever arrangement of the inoculated nodes in one of the configurations to achieve
this.

4.6

Conclusion

We have shown that a mediator can improve the social welfare in some strategic
games with a positive windfall of malice. We have also shown the limitation of this
technique for certain games.
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Future Directions

This chapter is organized in two sections. In section 5.1 we describe some open
problems regarding the W orm versus Alert game. In section 5.2 we describe some
open problems, and some preliminary research on some of the problems which we
have been working on.

5.1

Future work on the W orm versus Alert game

In our research in Chapters 3 and 4, the overlay network is a regular graph. We
conjecture that our results can be generalized to many graphs in which the maximum
degree a node can have is bounded by a constant d. Many other open problems
remain in the W orm versus Alert game including: (1) tightening the upper and
lower-bounds for the expansion needed in the overlay network to save almost all
of the nodes; (2) developing other models for the spread of a dynamic process and
its inhibitor over a network, and finding provably good strategies in these models;
(3)finding out an alert spreading algorithm to handle worms which are not limited to
infecting the network in θ(log n) rounds, where false alerts spread to polylogarithmic
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number of nodes.
For bullet 3, consider the following strategy which the worms could use against
the alert spreading algorithm. Assume that the worm has already been successful in
infecting log n number of nodes in the network, without alerting any detector nodes.
After that in each round the worm infects only one node. If it turns out to be a
detector node, in the next round it takes over nodes in the neighborhood of this
detector node to contain the spread of alerts. Let us assume that the time when the
first detector node has been alerted is 0. Let Zi be a random variable, giving the
number of alerted nodes at time step i. So by assumption, Z0 = 1. We can show the
following
Lemma 5.1. If (dγ < 1), then ∃n0 , s.t P r(Zn = 0) = 1 for all n ≥ n0 .

Proof. To prove the theorem, we reason that this process is a Galton-Watson Branching Process. Each time the worm tries to take over the children of a alerted detector
node, it can alerted a random number of detector nodes. The probability that each
of them turn out to be a detector node is γ. Let µ represent the expected number
detector nodes which are children of a detector node. We know that µ = dγ. From
[5] we know that
E[Zn ] = µn .

P
Since µ < 1 , E[ ∞
n=0 Zn ] = 1/(1 − µ) < ∞. This implies that the probability of
extinction is 1, or there exists an n0 at which the number of detector nodes alerted
will be zero.

Note that if the precondition of this lemma holds, then only detector nodes will be
alerted by this worm strategy. Assuming that τ is θ(log log n), the worm can resume
its previous strategy of infecting only one node in each time step after TTL expires.
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In our future attempts to solve this problem, we need to find an alert algorithm
to counter this particular worm strategy, or prove that the current alert strategy is
sufficient to counter this strategy for slow worms.
Another important direction of work, is to find algorithms for alerts which would
prevent large scale infection of nodes in other kinds of networks.

5.2

Future work in designing mediators

In Chapter 4 we describe a technique using mediators to decrease the social cost of
a well studied game with a high price of anarchy. Several open questions remain
including the following. First, can we determine necessary and sufficient conditions
for a game to allow a mediator that improves social welfare over the best Nash?
In particular, can we find such conditions for general congestion games? What
about arbitrary anonymous games? Second, for games where each player can choose
among k actions, can we say how many configurations are needed by any mediator?
Preliminary work in this direction shows that for 2 actions, sometimes more than 2
configurations are needed.
In the sections given below we present some very preliminary work on designing
mediators for some problems which we have pursued.

5.2.1

Multiround Games

In this section we describe mediators for a multiround game where the number of
rounds is finite but determined by a geometric random variable. Let us consider
the multiround pollution game. In this game, in each round, each player can either
choose to pollute and pay a cost of one or to not pollute and pay nothing. Each
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player pays an additional cost equal to the number of players who have decided to
pollute in that round. The mediator, suggests actions to each player in each round,
and comes to know of the strategies played out by the players in each round. Let
there be at least n players where n > 2. After every round, let the probability that
the game is over in the next round be p.
The optimal social cost for this game is n. We design a mediator, which is as
follows: Ask all the players to not pollute,and if any one disobeys, ask every player
to pollute after that in all the rounds.
The expected number of rounds the game will last is 1/p. So the expected cost
of not listening to the mediator is (1/p)(n-1). The expected cost of listening to the
mediator is just 1 + (1/p). So for all p such that (1 + (1/p)) ≤ (1/p)(n − 1) , there
is no reason not to listen to the mediator.
Another example of a multi-round game is the multi-round bandwidth sharing
game. This game has n players. Each player has an infinite set of strategies. Let
each player send xi units of flow along a channel where xi = [0, 1]. If Σj xj exceeds
the channel capacity, then no player get any benefit. If Σj xj < 1, then the utility of
the player i is xi (1 − Σj xj ). In other words the utility of each player decreases as the
flow in the channel increases.
It is also easy to see that for the multi-round bandwidth sharing game played over
infinite rounds, a punitive deterministic multi-round mediator improves the optimal
solution. The mediator at each round asks one player chosen uniformly at random
to send 1/2 and all the other players to send 0. If ever any player decides not to
follow the advice of the mediator, then in every successive round the mediator asks
every player to send 1/(n+1), thus reducing the utility of this player for all successive
rounds. For every rational player, the expected utility when listening to the player
is 1/4· (probability that it is chosen). The utility when not listening to the mediator
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is 1/(n + 1)2 . The optimal solution without a mediator is 1/(n + 1)2 for each player
in each round.
We would like to point out that a punitive multiround deterministic mediator
does not help the multi-round pollution game over finite number of rounds where
the number of rounds is known to every player. The basic idea is as follows. Every
player would pollute in the last round, because there are no repercussions to not
following the mediator in the last round. Since every player is selfish, it would thus
try to minimize its cost in the last but one round by polluting. Thus every player
would pollute in the last but one round as well. This analysis can be carried for
every round with the result that every player pollutes in every round.
This raises the question, are there other multiround games with a finite number of
rounds but the number of rounds being distributed according to distributions other
than the geometric distributions, where mediators can help?

5.2.2

Non-Responsive games and do Mediators help?

In work in Chapter 4, we had the restriction of bad nodes not being players in the
network. What if the bad players also have a choice of infecting nodes. In this
section we predict the probabilities of infection and inoculation on some network
topologies, for which there is a nash equilibria. In other words, for what probability
values of infection and inoculation will we achieve a nash equilibria. We are exploring
the question of using mediators in improving the social welfare in such equilibrium
situations. The notation remains the same for all the network topologies covered in
this section.
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Complete Graph
Model:In our model we consider a complete graph on n vertices. The cost of good
nodes is C1 to inoculate and L to get infected where C1 ≤ L. A virus pays a cost of
C2 to create a virus minus the number of infected nodes. In this section we try to find
the values of pg and pb for which there is a Nash equilibria with the following strategy
where each good guy inoculates with probability pg and each bad guy creates a virus
with probability pb and if it does, the virus infects a node in the network u.a.r and
all nodes reachable from it which are not inoculated. There are a total of n nodes in
the network. Let G be a r.v giving the utility of a good node and B be a r.v giving
the utility of a bad agent. Let the expected utility of a good guy be E(G), and for
a virus be E(B). Also let Qi =1/n(1 + (n − 1)(1 − pg )) = 1/n(n − (n − 1)pg ).
Lemma 5.2. E(G) = C1 pg + (1 − pg ) · pb · L · Qi .
Proof. The probability that the virus infects this node is pb · Qi , as this node is
attacked with probability pb /n and any other node among the n-1 nodes is attacked
successfully with probability pb /n · (1 − pg ). Since it is a clique, this node could get
a virus from any of the n − 1 nodes.
Lemma 5.3. E(B) = C2 pb − pb · (1 − pg )nQi .
Proof. The probability that a node is infected is (1 − pg )pb Qi , by arguments given
above. There are n such nodes, so the expected number of nodes infected is (1 −
pg )pb nQi . .
Let C(G,p) be the expected cost of a good node when pg = p. Let ∆(G, ) be
C(G, pg ) − C(G, pg + ). Similarly let C(B,p) be the expected cost of a node when
pb = p. Let ∆(B, ) be C(B, pb − C(B, pb + ).
Fact 5.1. ∆(G, )= (C1 − Lpb Qi ).
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Fact 5.2. ∆(B, ) = (C2 − (1 − pg )(n − (n − 1)pg ).
Fact 5.3. If C2 = (n − 1)p2g − (2n − 1)pg + n and C1 = (1/n)Lpb (n − (n − 1)pg ) then
the system is in a Nash equilibria.
Fact 5.4. In a Nash equilibria, pg =

√
(2n−1)± 4nC2 −4C2 +1
2(n−1)

√

= θ( n− nnC2 )

√

1 n
)
Lemma 5.4. In a Nash equilibria, pb = θ( LC√
C2

Proof. From fact 5.3 we get

nC1
L(n − (n − 1)pg )
C1
= θ(
)
L(1 − pg )
C1
√
= θ(
)(Substituting pg from fact 5.4)
L(1 − n− nnC2 )
√
C1 n
= θ( √ )
L C2

pb =

Let the social welfare of the grid be denoted by SW(Grid)
√
√
Lemma 5.5. In a a Nash equilibria SW(Grid)=θ( nC2 C1 ) + θ(n − nC2 )

Proof. The expected cost due to the bad nodes is pb (1 − pg )n(1 − pg )L.
The expected cost due to the good nodes is npg .
Substituting the values of PB and PG from fact 5.4 and 5.4, we get
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√
√
p
C1 n
n − nC2 2
)) n.L + θ(n − nC2 )
SW (Grid) = θ( √ )(1 − (
n
L C2
√
p
C1 n C2
= θ( √ ) nL + θ(n − nC2 )
L C n
p 2
p
= θ( nC2 C1 ) + θ(n − nC2 )

Here we state the main theorem of this section.
Lemma 5.6. As n → ∞ , pg → 1 and pb → 1.
Proof. Solving for pg in the quadratic equation in fact 5.3, we get pg =
which tends to 1 as n → 0. Similarly solving for PB we get

nC1
L

√
(2n−1)± 4nc2 −4c2 +1
2(n−1)

which tends to ∞ as

n → ∞, or pb = 1.
Corollary 2. If C2 = θ(n), then pb =

C1
.
L

It is a corollary of lemma 5.4.
Lemma 5.7. For n=1, there is a nash equilibria for pb = C1 /L and pg = 1 − c2 .
Proof. From lemma 5.2, 5.3, 5.1 and 5.2 we know that

• E(G) = pg C1 + (1 − pg )pb L
• E(B) = pb C2 − pb (1 − pg )
• ∆(G, ) = (C1 − pb L)
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• ∆(B, ) = (C2 − (1 − pg ))
Setting ∆(G, ) and ∆(B, ) equal to zero, we get pb = c1 /l and pg = (1 − c2 )
respectively

Grid
In this section, we find the values of pg and pb for which we achieve a Nash equilibria
when the game is carried out on a Grid. The notations carry over from the previous
section. The grid has n nodes, therefore the number of rows and columns in the grid
√
is n. The size of a connected component of uninoculated nodes is α consisting of
√
√
α rows and columns. Therefore every ( α + 1)th row/column is a row/column of
inoculated nodes.
1
Lemma 5.8. E(B) = pb C2 − pb (1 − ( √α+1
)2 ) · α.

Proof. Number of inoculated rows/columns =

√
n
√
.
α+1

√ √
n
Number of nodes in the inoculated rows/columns = √α+1
n.

Number of nodes inoculated = number of nodes inoculated in rows + number of
nodes inoculated in columns - the nodes which have been over counted because they
were in the intersection of rows and columns,
√ or
√ √
(n) √
n
n + √α+1 n Number of nodes inoculated= √α+1

√
n
√
α+1

Therefore the probability that a node is inoculated =

·

√
n
√
α+1

√2
α+1

−

Therefore the probability that a node is uninoculated = (1 −

n
= √α+1
(2 −

√ 1
.
( α+1)2
√ 1 )2 .
α+1

Since the total number of nodes in an uninoculated component is α,
E(B) = pb C2 − pb (1 −

√ 1 )2 α.
α+1

Fact 5.5. ∆(B, ) = (C2 − (1 −

√ 1 )2 )α.
α+1

Fact 5.6. If ∆(B, ) = 0, then α = θ(C2 ).
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Lemma 5.9. For an uninoculated node the expected cost of choosing to not inoculate
is pb 2αL
.
n
Proof. If an inoculate node decided to not inoculate then it would be connecting 2
connected component of uninoculated nodes. The bad agent can infect this large
. Since the cost of infection is L, the
connected component with probability pb 2α
n
.
expected cost is pb 2αL
n
Lemma 5.10. For an uninoculated node, the expected cost to remain uninoculated
is pb Lα
.
n
Proof. The probability of getting infected by the bad agent is pb αn . So the expected
cost is pb Lα
.
n
Lemma 5.11. For a nash equilibria to hold, pb 2αL
> C1 > pb Lα
.
n
n
Proof. We get pb 2αL
> C1 from lemma 5.9 and C1 > pb Lα
from lemma 5.10.
n
n
1L
Lemma 5.12. If ∆(B, ) = 0, pb = θ( C
).
C2 L

Proof. From fact 5.6 we know that α = θ(c2 ). Substituting these values in the
inequalities of lemma 5.11, we get pb >

C1 n
θ(C2 )L

and pb <

C1 n
.
θ(C2 )L

Therefore pb =

θ( CC21Ln ).
Corollary 3. For α = θ(C2 ), there is a nash equilibria on the grid.
Proof. This result is a corollary of lemma 5.12.
Lemma 5.13. If α = θ(C2 ), the social welfare of nodes on the grid is θ(C1 n).
Proof. The probability that the uninoculated nodes have been hit by a bad agent is
1
pb (1 − ( √α+1
)2 ) . The total loss in that component is αL. The number of inoculated
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2
nodes is n( √α+1
−

√ 1
).
( α+1)2

So the cost due to nodes which have inoculated is

2
1
2
√1
√2
n( √α+1
− (√α+1)
2 )C1 . Therefore the social welfare is pb (1 − ( α+1 ) ) · αL + n( α+1 −
√ 1
)C1 .
( α+1)2

Substituting the value of pb from lemma 5.12 in the previous expression

we get the social welfare as θ(C1 n)θ(1 −

√1 )
C2

nC1
+ θ( √
). In this expression θ(C1 n)
C2

dominates.
In conclusion we would like to add that we have not found any evidence of the
mediator coming to our rescue for the virus inoculation game played in chapter 4.
We also could not find a way for a mediator to help when there are m bad players
who attack the network with the spoils divided equally among all of the players. An
important future direction in this area would be to find games which improve the
social welfare in the the case of non responsive players, and to explore the case of
multiround games between non-responsive players.

5.2.3

Mediators for congestion control protocol

In this section, we decided to ascertain if the congestion control protocol as described
below, has a high price of anarchy. We describe our preliminary results in some detail
below.
Model: There are n agents who are competing to send a bit of information
through a shared channel. Time consists of discreet time slots. If more than one
agent tries to send there is a collision. A player leaves the game once it is successful in
sending the bit. A strategy of a player is the probability of sending a message at that
round. We assume that this game is non-blocking. i.e the transmission probability
for every player is less than one. We assume that this game is time independent
and symmetric, i.e the transmission probability in each round is dependent only on
the number of remaining players in that round and not the round number, and the
transmission probability is the same for all players. In our model the utility of any
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player decreases exponentially by a factor of α < 1 in each successive round. The
utility of sending it in the first round is 1. Let p be the nash equilibrium probability
when there are k players remaining in the game. Let Vk be the expected cost for a
player when there are k players remaining in the game.
Analysis: Suppose a player decides to deterministically send in every round.
The expected cost in that case is
V (k) = (1 − p)k−1 · 1 + [1 − (1 − p)k−1 ]αV (k)

(5.1)

If this is a nash equilibrium it should be the case that the value of V (k) when
probability is 0, 1 or p should be the same and all of them should be best responses.

Also
V (k) = (k − 1)p(1 − p)k−2 αV (k − 1) + [1 − (k − 1)p(1 − p)k−2 ]αV (k)

(5.2)

The first term on R.H.S calculates the probability of some player other than the
player being considered being able to send through the channel. The second term
on R.H.S considers the probability that no player is able to send.

Theorem 5.7.

1
α(k−1)

=



1
1−α)V (k)1/k−1 (1−α(V (k))1−1/(k−1)



(V (k − 1) − V (k)).

Proof. Equation 5.1 and 5.2 imply the identity

i
Let V ∗ (k) be the optimal value of V (k). Therefore V ∗ (k)=1/k(Σk−1
i=0 α ). For

α = 1 − 1/100 our empirical results suggested a high price of anarchy for this model.
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[56] Péter Ször and Peter Ferrie. Hunting for metamorphic. In In Virus Bulletin
Conference, pages 123–144, 2001.
[57] Chris Talbot. Phishing Attacks Up More Than 200% in May, says IBM, 2005.
http://www.integratedmar.com/ecl-usa/story.cfm?item=19703.
[58] Milan Vojnovic and Ayalvadi Ganesh. On the effectiveness of automatic patching. In ACM Workshop on Rapid Malcode (WORM), 2005.

101

References

[59] Helen J. Wang, Chuanxiong Guo, Daniel R. Simon, and Alf Zugenmaier. Shield:
Vulnerability-driven network filters for preventing known vulnerability exploits.
In Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications, pages 193–204. ACM, 2004.
[60] Martyn Williams. http://www.pcworld.com/article/109163/slammer was fastest spreading worm
[61] Matthew M. Williamson. Throttling viruses: Restricting propagation to defeat
malicious mobile code. 2002.
[62] Vinod Yegneswaran, Jonathan T. Giffin, Paul Barford, and Somesh Jha. An
architecture for generating semantics-aware signatures. In Proceedings of the
14th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 97–112. Baltimore, MD, USA, 2005.
[63] Lidong Zhou, Lintao Zhang, Frank McSherry, Nicole Immorlica, Manuel Costa,
and Steve Chien. A first look at peer-to-peer worms: Threats and defenses. In
International Symposium on Peer-to-peer Systems (IPTPS), 2005.
[64] Jianwei Zhuge, Thorsten Holz, Chengyu Song, Jinpeng Guo, Xinhui Han, and
Wei Zou. Studying malicious websites and the underground economy on the
chinese web. informatik. Technical report, on the Chinese web. Workshop on
the Economics of Information Security (WEIS, 2007.

102

